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Angst as Evidence: Shifting Phenomenology's Measure

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1 Introduction

Being and Time (BT) is meant to radically revise the basic concepts of traditional ontology and metaphysics, but it is also intended to shake the foundations of the phenomenological science envisioned by Heidegger's teacher, Edmund Husserl. As Heidegger writes:

The real 'movement' of the sciences takes place when their basic concepts undergo a more or less radical revision which is transparent to itself. The level which a science has reached is determined by how far it is *capable* of a crisis in its basic concepts. [...] Basic concepts determine the way in which we get an understanding beforehand of the area of subject-matter underlying all the objects a science takes as its theme, and all positive investigation is guided by this understanding. Only after the area itself has been explored beforehand in a corresponding manner do these concepts become genuinely demonstrated and 'grounded'. (SZ 9–10)

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19 While explicitly Heidegger's aim here is to convince the reader of the
20 exigency of a radicalization of ontology and its basic concepts, implicitly
21 *BT* is about a crisis in the very science of phenomenology—its methods
22 and epistemological foundations: *BT* is meant to lay the foundations of
23 phenomenology anew. This helps to explain why Heidegger dedicated
24 the book to Husserl.¹ *BT* not only shifts attention of the theme of
25 phenomenological research from the theme of intentionality to the
26 meaning of Being, and from the transcendental ego to the factual structure
27 of Dasein; it also shifts the *measure* of what counts as epistemic
28 justification.

29 Indeed, Heidegger's project is incompatible with epistemology and
30 its basic concepts such as “epistemic justification”, for reasons that will
31 become clearer later on. Strictly speaking, *BT* is not about epistemic
32 justification: it is not a treatise that yields justified “knowledge” in
33 the theoretical sense, but rather it is an interpretive text that formally
34 indicates the provisional results of a phenomenology of Dasein and its
35 structural make-up.² However, even a hermeneutic treatise makes phil-
36 osophical claims that have *the status of knowledge*, in the sense that they
37 are grounded in and phenomenologically justified by evidence. Insofar
38 as this is the case, and for the purpose of making this chapter more
39 engaging to analytic readers, we can assume that *BT* offers something
40 *like* epistemic justification.

41 Both Heidegger and Husserl embark on a project of laying bare the
42 ground upon which meaning is made possible, and in the process offer
43 new categories which conceptually grasp meaning. The two philosophical
44 projects share the transcendental aim of identifying a priori conditions
45 of meaning. However, while Husserl's transcendental project conceptual-
46 izes meaning in terms of intentionality and theoretical *knowledge*, i.e.
47 ideal intentional structures that comprise scientific knowledge, Heidegger
48 is interested in more primordial structures that ground meaning in the
49 sense of *understanding*. Husserl tries to lay bare the ground of know-
50 ing the world, Heidegger tries to lay bare the ground of understanding
51 the world. For Heidegger, meaning is the achievement of understand-
52 ing. What is more, understanding, for Heidegger, is hermeneutic. As
53 Taylor Carman argues, *BT* aims to analyze the phenomenon of inter-
54 pretation, which is “the express or explicit (*ausdrücklich*) understanding



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55 of something *as* something” (Carman 2003, 5). In sum, *BT* is a treatise
56 that aims to uncover the horizon, i.e. the a priori structures, that allow
57 for understanding and interpretation to emerge.

58 In order to achieve such a foundationalist project, both Husserl and
59 Heidegger must clarify the conditions of possibility of meaning, and
60 this inevitably includes developing the criteria for justificatory evidence.
61 Phenomenology is, after all, a project that aims to ground its findings
62 in phenomenological *evidence*, so as to counter dogmatic/speculative
63 metaphysics. As I hope to show, an important aspect of *BT* is that,
64 through this work, Heidegger radicalizes the basic concept of “evidence”
65 that is operative in Husserlian phenomenology, which commits Husserl
66 to mentalist evidentialism. Thus, Heidegger overcomes mentalist evi-
67 dentialism and relaunches phenomenology on the basis of a different
68 “epistemic” measure.

69 In this chapter, I will analyze the fundamental mood of Angst
70 in terms of evidence and certainty, so as to better illustrate the
71 methodological role it plays in *BT*. As I will show, Angst serves as the
72 hermeneutic equivalent to what analytic epistemologists call “justifier of
73 knowledge”, that is, it takes on the function of *evidence* that phenome-
74 nologically grounds the interpretation of the basic structures of Dasein,
75 as these are disclosed in authentic existence. Angst is evidence for the
76 factual, temporal truth of Dasein—it is evidence for the encounter of
77 death as the possibility of impossibility, which holds open the deep tem-
78 poral structure of Dasein. It is in Angst that Dasein finds itself face to
79 face with the “nothing”—the ultimate possibility-for-Being.

80 The role of Angst in *BT* marks an epistemological shift, in which
81 Heidegger radicalizes Husserl’s conception of experiential justification
82 and the associated notion of evidence, which commits him (Husserl)
83 to mentalist evidentialism.³ I will argue that Heidegger’s position (in
84 *BT*) is a phenomenological conception of experiential justification that,
85 while still committing him to quasi-evidentialist principles, makes his
86 position incompatible with either internalism or mentalism.

87 While Husserl, in *Ideas I*, establishes phenomenological inquiry on
88 the evidence provided by *originary intuition*, Heidegger wants to over-
89 throw this reflective beginning which anchors evidence on perceptual
90 experience in which the content is presented as bodily present, so as to



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91 allow epistemic justification to arise from “*owned feelings*”, specifically
92 the existential feeling of Angst. The latter does not disclose by presenti-
93 fying something (as clear and distinct presence), but rather discloses the
94 structural whole of Dasein, pre-reflectively, pre-conceptually, and in an
95 indeterminate manner.

96 The chapter comprises four sections and a concluding remark. In
97 Sect. 2, entitled “Phenomenology as a Foundationalist Project: Grounding
98 Knowledge/Interpretation in Evidence”, I argue that the primary tenden-
99 cies in phenomenology (both Husserlian and Heideggerian) are founda-
100 tionalist in nature, its aims being to ground knowledge/interpretation
101 in evidence. In Sect. 3, entitled “Husserl’s Conception of Evidence”,
102 I provide an overview of Husserl’s conception of evidence as Apodictic
103 Certainty. Then, borrowing from Philipp Berghofer’s recent work, I ana-
104 lyze Husserl’s *phenomenological* conception of experiential justification,
105 focusing on its self-giving character and finally explaining why Husserl’s
106 position is mentalist evidentialist. In Sect. 4, entitled “The Critique of
107 Husserl and Evidence in *Being and Time*”, I show how Heidegger redevelop-
108 ed the notion of evidence in critical contrast to Husserl’s. I then sketch
109 out the notion of evidence operative in *BT*, with specific focus on Angst as
110 evidence. Finally, in Sect. 5, entitled “Angst and Mentalist Evidentialism”,
111 I analyze how Angst as evidence makes Heidegger’s position in *BT* incom-
112 patible with the basic tenets of Husserl’s mentalist evidentialism.

113 2 Phenomenology as a Foundationalist 114 Project: Grounding Knowledge/ 115 Interpretation in Evidence

116 Insofar as the idea of evidence is integral to the idea of scientific
117 grounding, we must firstly look at the idea of “grounding” itself and
118 the way in which it operates in phenomenology. Husserl’s phenom-
119 enology is a project of grounding knowledge in *evidence*. In a sense,
120 the Husserlian project is a modern philosophical one whose aim is to
121 offer a foundation for cognitive knowledge, in line with the general
122 idea of science. As such, it is a continuation of the Cartesian project of



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123 discovering a safe starting point that can serve as the foundation upon
124 which to build the philosophical edifice. This grounding character per-
125 meates the entire Husserlian corpus, from the early to the later works. It
126 is, I think, safe to say that Husserlian phenomenology is a type of founda-
127 tionalist exercise with the overarching aim of achieving a version of
128 epistemological foundationalism.⁴ And if phenomenology claims to be
129 a presuppositionless science, then it must offer the evidence upon which
130 the epistemic edifice rests. “Evidence” is therefore the rationale for the
131 development of his scientific transcendental phenomenology; it is “the
132 hidden spring of phenomenology” (Öktem 2009, 5).

133 As Philipp Berghofer argues, Husserl makes clear that “there is
134 more to knowledge than true belief/judgment. Not every true belief
135 is knowledge. This more that is required is *evidence*” (Berghofer 2018,
136 1). Science demands that cognition [*Erkenntnis*] has to be based on
137 *real grounding* [*Begründung*], which is grounding on “pure evidence”
138 (Berghofer 2018, 3), and without the notion of evidence, science itself,
139 as Husserl understands it, would not make sense! (Berghofer 2018, 2)

140 In this context, insofar as phenomenology is about grounding tran-
141 scendental knowledge in intuitive evidence, it is useful to think of both
142 Heidegger and Husserl as belonging to the Kantian tradition. *BT* is a
143 transcendental project, one that aims to uncover the horizon for the
144 interpretation of meaning (of being in general). It is a treatise that
145 uncovers transcendental structures (*existentials*). As Carman notes, Kant
146 was interested in “epistemic conditions”, and Heidegger was interested
147 in “conditions of interpretation or explicit understanding” (Carman
148 2003, 12). While Heidegger’s project of fundamental ontology is indeed
149 irreducible to Kant’s transcendental idealism, I agree with Carman that
150 there is a useful analogy to be drawn between what Henry Allison called
151 Kant’s “epistemic conditions” and Heidegger’s “hermeneutic conditions”
152 (*ibid.*).

153 Insofar as Husserl’s aim was to ensure that the findings of phe-
154 nomenology amount to justified knowledge, he puts the epoché in
155 place and devises the Principle of All Principles, which determines the
156 golden epistemological standard of apodictic certainty. In effect, the
157 Principle of All Principles purifies consciousness and guarantees that



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158 phenomenological reflection, i.e. originary intuition, provides *evi-*
159 *dence* for transcendental knowledge. Husserl had to develop a method
160 that would deem philosophy autonomous and self-responsible. In this
161 context,

162 Husserl developed the method of the reductions in order to do justice to
163 what he took to be the fundamental norm governing philosophy, namely,
164 the norm of “ultimate philosophical self-responsibility.” Because philo-
165 sopherical inquiry can take nothing for granted—neither from the sciences
166 nor from previous philosophies—it must be radically first-personal. Only
167 what I can validate on the basis of my own evidential insight can stand
168 as actual philosophical knowledge; the assertions of others are initially
169 merely “empty,” mere truth-claims that I must demonstrate for myself
170 against the things that “fulfill” them. To take responsibility for evidential
171 fulfillment defines the *practice* of philosophizing. The various reductions,
172 then—including the reduction of one’s own being to transcendental
173 consciousness—are meant to stake out the kind of *Evidenz* that measures
174 up to the norm, the first-person experience within which any possible
175 claim to meaning and being must be assessed. (Crowell 2013, 76)

176 But the demand for evidential self-responsibility is also a basic
177 tendency in Heidegger’s early phenomenology, culminating in *BT*. As
178 Crowell rightly argues, this demand is actually *built into* the structure
179 of *BT*, beginning from the “everyday lostness in the anonymity of *das*
180 *Man* to that point where Dasein can genuinely say ‘I,’ that is, recover its
181 ‘ownmost’ self and so be responsible to itself. This is the methodological
182 significance of the chapters on death, conscience, and authenticity as
183 resoluteness” (Crowell 2013, 76–77).

184 Division II of *BT* has as a purpose to clarify how Dasein is able to
185 authentically understand itself from the first person perspective and
186 achieve transparency as to the foundational structures of being-in-
187 the-world. This is not to say that *BT* is based on a projected ideal of
188 total self-realization, or self-actualization, or completion. I agree
189 with Carman here that such a totalizing prospect is incoherent and in
190 principle impossible for Dasein (Carman 2003, 226). Heideggerian
191 authenticity is the achievement of “resoluteness” [*Entschlossenheit*] and
192 of such self-responsibility. Resoluteness is a comportment that is as



193 much about a way of existence as it is about a way of relating to the
194 being of the world and its ontological structures, i.e. a way of under-
195 standing how the meaning of Being is constituted. It is, in other words,
196 a primordial understanding of the grounding (transcendental) structures
197 of the meaning of Being. Resoluteness, therefore, has a methodologi-
198 cal function: it is a normative criterion that, once brought into view,
199 enables the *reinterpretation* of Dasein and the meaning of Being, much
200 like the epoché in Husserl enables the reinterpretation of phenomena.
201 We ought to think of Heidegger's notion of resoluteness in *BT* as anal-
202 ogous to Husserl's Principle of Evidence and the Apodictic Reduction
203 inasmuch as they all ground transcendental knowledge in evidence.
204 The difference between them lies in their definitions of evidence and
205 the way they close down or open up the limits of self-knowledge/
206 self-understanding. In Husserl's case, evidence is attached to the self-cer-
207 tainty of a transcendental ego that *knows* itself absolutely, whereas in
208 Heidegger's, evidence is attached to a thrown Dasein that finitely *under-*
209 *stands* itself in unresolvable tension with its own facticity.

210 3 Husserl's Conception of Evidence

211 3.1 Originary Intuition and Apodictic Certainty

212 The very "discovery" of the notion of "evidence" is associated with the
213 process of "genuine grounding," as Husserl himself says in *Cartesian*
214 *Meditations (CM)*, in which he argues that in "explicating more pre-
215 cisely the sense of a grounding or that of a cognition, we come forth-
216 with to the idea of *evidence*" (Husserl 1982, 10). In *CM*, Husserl lays
217 down the so-called "first methodological principle," which organizes
218 his scientific project and postulates that "genuine science, must neither
219 make or go on accepting any judgment as scientific *that I have not*
220 *derived from evidence*, from 'experiences' in which the affairs and
221 affair-complexes in question are present to me as 'they themselves'"
222 (Husserl 1982, 14). But a similar version of this principle was already in
223 operation earlier in *Ideas I*. There, Husserl referred to the "Principle of
224 All Principles," which stipulates that



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225 every ordinary presentive intuition is a legitimizing source of cognition,
226 that everything originally [...] offered to us in “intuition” is to be accepted
227 simply as what it is presented as being, but also only within the limits in
228 which it is presented there. We see indeed that each <theory> can only
229 again draw its truth itself from originary [sic] data. Every statement [...] *CM*
230 conforming to them is [...] actually an *absolute beginning* called upon
231 to serve as foundation, a *principium* in the genuine sense of the word.
232 (Husserl 1983, 44)

233 “Evidence” is therefore implicit in the notion of laying a foundation for
234 legitimizing knowledge, and this laying serves as a principled *beginning*
235 for the entire philosophical endeavor. It is, in other words, associated
236 with the very act of *beginning to philosophize*. In *CM*, Husserl explicitly
237 connects apodictic evidence with the beginning of philosophy. As
238 he writes:

239 In accordance with what has already been said, we now formulate, as an
240 initial definite question of beginning philosophy, the question whether
241 it is possible for us to bring out evidences that, on the one hand, carry
242 with them—as we now must say: apodictically—the insight that, as
243 “first in themselves,” they precede all other imaginable evidences and, on
244 the other hand, can be seen to be themselves apodictic. If they should
245 turn out to be inadequate, they would have to possess at least a recog-
246 nizable apodictic content, they would have to give us some being that is
247 firmly secured “once for all,” or absolutely, by virtue of their apodicticity.
248 (Husserl 1982, 16)

249 In his 2001 article “Apodictic Evidence,” Hans Bernhard Schmid
250 divides Husserl’s work from 1900 to 1936 into five major stages, and
251 claims that “Husserl’s concern with ‘evidence’ remains more or less on
252 the same level of intensity throughout his work” (Schmid 2001, 223).
253 In this context, “apodicticity” becomes more important in the course
254 of the development of Husserl’s thought, its role peaking in the *CM*.
255 Indeed, in his later works, after the 1920s, Husserl distances himself
256 from his earlier thinking on “evidence,” which was based on the ideal of
257 adequation, and accords primacy to “apodicticity,” a notion he had not
258 paid attention to earlier.



259 Husserl's analysis of "evidence" in *CM* typifies his revised position on
260 evidence and his shift from adequation to apodicticity. In §5, entitled
261 "Evidence and the Idea of Genuine Science," Husserl defines evidence thus:
262 "Evidence is, in an *extremely broad sense* [...] a mental seeing of something
263 itself" (Husserl 1982, 12). And: "*Perfect evidence* and its correlate, *pure and*
264 *genuine truth*, are given as ideas lodged in the striving for knowledge, for
265 fulfilment of one's meaning intention" (ibid.). Further on, in §6, he clarifies
266 that the idea of "perfection" corresponds to that of "*adequate evidence*," and
267 so it is the idea that replaces the older normative notion of adequacy, which
268 is no longer an achievable ideal. On the contrary, this "perfection," called
269 "apodicticity," can occur even in evidence that is inadequate. Apodictic
270 evidence, according to Husserl, "is not merely certainty of the affairs or
271 affair-complexes (states-of-affairs) evident in it; rather it [has the] peculiar-
272 ity of being *at the same time the absolute unimaginableness* (inconceivability)
273 of their *non-being*, and thus excluding in advance every doubt as 'objectless,'
274 empty" (Husserl 1982, 15–16).

275 3.2 Husserl's Mentalist Evidentialism

276 Philipp Berghofer argues that insofar as Husserl's phenomenology is a
277 project of "first philosophy," of "ultimate justification" [*Letztbegründung*],
278 its basic epistemological character can and ought to be analyzed also
279 in contemporary epistemology terms. Berghofer argues that Husserl's
280 epistemological position, the way he conceives of the systematic role of evi-
281 dence, makes him a *mentalist evidentialist* (Berghofer 2018). For Husserl,
282 evidence is the criterion by virtue of which the subject distinguishes the
283 reasonable from the unreasonable, and the better justified from the worse
284 justified. Ultimately, evidence is coextensive with scientificity: "all scientific
285 knowledge [...] rests on evidence: as far as such evidence extends, the
286 concept of knowledge extends also" (Berghofer 2018, 2). In other words,
287 evidence determines epistemic justification (Berghofer 2018, 11).

288 Evidence is a mode of givenness: it is a quality of the intuitive mode,
289 in which "the object is presented as 'bodily present' and is given in a
290 'fleshed out manner'" (Berghofer 2018, 4). But intuitiveness, and hence
291 evidence, for Husserl, does not only refer to sensuous intuition (i.e. sense



292 experience of objects); it can also broadly refer to “categorical intuitions
293 of states of affairs, essential intuitions of logical or mathematical or phe-
294 nomenological truths, [as well as] introspective intuitions of one’s own
295 mental states” (ibid.). In this respect, then, according to Berghofer, the
296 current analytic epistemology that exhibits crucial similarities to Husserl’s
297 theory of evidence is mentalist evidentialism (Berghofer 2018, 12).

298 The basic tenets of mentalist evidentialism, as determined by Conee
299 and Feldman, are that “epistemic justification of a belief is determined
300 by the quality of the believer’s evidence for the belief” and that “evi-
301 dence determines justification” (as cited in Berghofer 2018, 12–13). At
302 the same time, Conee and Feldman’s evidentialism is internalist because
303 the ultimate justifier for beliefs, the evidence that justifies beliefs, is
304 “internal to the person’s mental life” (Berghofer 2018, 13). More specifi-
305 cally, the nature of evidence consists in “mental states.”

306 This does not mean that *all* mental states are justifiers (i.e. count as evi-
307 dence); rather, it means that all justifiers are mental states. For example,
308 writes Berghofer, some “*unconscious, indeterminate state of anxiety may be a*
309 *mental state, but it may not be a justifier*” (Berghofer 2018, 14; my emphasis).

310 In sum, what Husserl shares with Conee and Feldman’s mentalist evi-
311 dentialism is the following: Husserl, like them, “holds that (a) evidence
312 determines justification, (b) evidence consists of mental states [which, for
313 Husserl, are originary presentive intuitions], and (c) one’s ultimate evi-
314 dence consists of one’s experiences” (ibid.). Hence, mentalist evidentialism
315 perfectly captures Husserl’s position on the systematic role of evidence—in
316 modern epistemological parlance, Husserl is a mentalist evidentialist.

317 4 Heidegger’s Critique of Husserl 318 and the Notion of Evidence 319 in *Being and Time*

320 4.1 Heidegger’s Alternative Beginning: Affective 321 Evidence vs. Intuitive Evidence

322 Heidegger’s ontological rehabilitation of affects involves a radicalization
323 of the very notion of evidence, of what counts as evidence. His claim



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324 that moods are ontological evidence involves a methodological rad-
325 icalization of phenomenology itself, *contra* Husserl. In particular,
326 Heidegger's rehabilitation of moods involves a—sometimes tacit, some-
327 times explicit—juxtaposition of affective evidence with the Cartesian/
328 Husserlian criteria of *clarity and distinction*, the certainty of reflection
329 and originary intuition, which determine the Husserlian notion of
330 evidence.

331 The Cartesian/Husserlian epistemological criteria delimit ontological
332 discoveries; hence, a breakthrough involving those criteria would radi-
333 calize ontological findings, enable the question of the meaning of Being
334 to be posed and allow ontology to move beyond “Being as presence.”
335 For example, in *BT*, Heidegger argues that “the absolute ‘Being-certain’
336 [*Gewissen*] of the *cogito* exempted [Descartes] from raising the question
337 of the meaning of the Being which [Dasein] possesses” (SZ 24). If the
338 idea of evidence is coterminous with the ideas of certainty and clarity,
339 it goes without saying that the findings of an ontological inquiry that
340 takes said idea of evidence as a measure, will be in a position to only
341 discover an epistemic ground that resembles these ideas.

342 It is with these ideas that Heidegger takes issue. Heidegger held that
343 Husserl's phenomenology, just like Descartes' inquiry, was “*guided by the*
344 *predominance of an empty and thereby fantastic idea of certainty and evi-*
345 *dence*” (IPR 33). What remains absent and undiscovered in Husserlian
346 phenomenology is precisely the *factual* ground of knowledge, which
347 cannot be grasped by the epistemic criteria that he adopts. Such criteria
348 hold the key to ensuing discoveries.

349 Phenomenology must strive to make manifest the ground which
350 normally remains hidden. “Every inquiry,” Heidegger argues, “is a
351 seeking [*Suchen*]. Every seeking gets guided beforehand by what is
352 sought” (IPR 24). Phenomenology lets us see

353 something that proximally and for the most part does *not* show itself at all:
354 it is something that lies *hidden*, in contrast to that which proximally and
355 for the most part does show itself. [...] Yet that which remains *hidden* in
356 an egregious sense, or which relapses and gets *covered up* again, or which
357 shows itself only “*in disguise*,” is not just this entity or that, but rather the
358 *Being* of entities, as our previous observations have shown. (IPR 59)



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359 Unlike in Husserl, Heidegger's phenomenology allows moods, existen-
360 tial feelings, to count as evidence for Dasein's facticity—the ground of
361 the understanding of the meaning of Being.

362 In *Ideas I*, Husserl establishes phenomenological inquiry on the evi-
363 dence provided by originary intuition, following the epoché. Heidegger
364 wants to overthrow this reflective beginning (see Hadjioannou 2018);
365 he wants another methodological beginning, one that takes the pre-re-
366 flective evidence supplied by moods as a vantage point, and that allows
367 the phenomenologist to *see past the objects of intuition* and take affec-
368 tive movement as evidence of ontological understanding. The affective
369 beginning on the basis of evidence supplied by *Angst* is *analogous* to
370 the Husserlian departure from originary intuition, because it serves the
371 same methodological function. As Heidegger writes:

372 The way in which Being and its structures are encountered in the mode
373 of phenomenon is one which must first of all be *wrested* from the objects
374 of phenomenology. Thus the very *point of departure* [*Ausgang*] for our
375 analysis requires that it be secured by the proper method, just as much as
376 does our *access* [*Zugang*] to the phenomenon, or our *passage* [*Durchgang*]
377 through whatever is prevalently covering it up. The idea of grasping and
378 explicating phenomena in a way which is “original” and “intuitive” [*orig-*
379 *inären* and *intuitiven*] is directly opposed to the *naïveté* of a haphazard,
380 “immediate,” and unreflective “beholding” [*Schauen*]. (*IPR* 61)

381 Heidegger repeatedly juxtaposes the kind of evidence supplied by
382 *Angst* with the kind of evidence supplied by the apodictic certainty of
383 theoretical cognition—a clear, albeit implicit, reference to Husserl's apo-
384 dictic certainty of phenomenological reflection. For example, Heidegger
385 writes: “From the existential-ontological point of view, there is not the
386 slightest justification for minimizing what is ‘evident’ in dispositions,
387 by measuring it against apodictic certainty of a theoretical cognition
388 of something which is purely present-at-hand” (*SZ* 175; translation
389 modified).

390 As mentioned above, the problem of evidence amounts to a meth-
391 odological problem of beginning: it is about discovering an acceptable
392 vantage point from which the science of phenomenology can begin.



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393 In other words, what is sought is a point from which one becomes a
394 proper phenomenologist, one “switches” from being inauthentic to
395 being authentic. Husserl discovers this measure in originary intuition,
396 which is discovered after the epoché—the reflective bracketing of the
397 natural attitude. Can Heidegger then “discover” within facticity the
398 phenomenological structure that enables Dasein to overcome its inau-
399 thenticity, that is, to exist either inauthentically or authentically, which
400 is Dasein's existentiality? As Heidegger says:

401 If the existential analytic of Dasein is to retain clarity in principle as to
402 its function in fundamental ontology, then in order to master its provi-
403 sional task of exhibiting Dasein's Being, it must seek for one of the *most*
404 *far-reaching* and *most primordial* possibilities of disclosure—one that lies
405 in Dasein itself. The way of disclosure in which Dasein brings itself before
406 itself must be such that in it Dasein becomes accessible as *simplified* in a
407 certain manner. With what is thus disclosed, the structural totality of the
408 Being we seek must then come to light in an elemental way. (SZ 182)

409 Heidegger then points out that the phenomenon that satisfies these
410 methodological requirements is *the fundamental mood of anxiety*: “As
411 one of Dasein's possibilities of Being, anxiety—together with Dasein
412 itself as disclosed in it—provides the phenomenal basis for explicitly
413 grasping Dasein's primordial totality of Being” (ibid.). Hence,
414 Heidegger identifies a particular aspect of the existential constitution of
415 Being-in-the-World, i.e. a disposition, which enables Dasein to *become*
416 *authentic* and reveal the unity of existentiality and facticity.⁵

417 Moods are pre-reflective, and hence what they disclose and the
418 way they disclose it *precedes* the range of disclosure of “cognition”
419 and “volition”: “ontologically mood is a primordial kind of Being for
420 Dasein, in which Dasein is disclosed to itself *prior* to all cognition
421 and volition, and *beyond* their range of disclosure” (ibid.). In a sense,
422 then, *one needs to set the bar “lower” in order to enable the pre-reflective,*
423 *affective, understanding of Being to become evident.* Moods are normally
424 taken to *distort* understanding rather than to be constitutive of it; they
425 are seen as leading one to err, as factors of instability and uncertainty,
426 and therefore they are taken not to count as evidence for understanding,



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427 since knowledge is associated with justified certainty. What is missed
428 is the positive evidentiary capacity of moods, since the Husserlian/
429 Cartesian principle—apodictic certainty—is associated with indisputa-
430 ble, clear and distinct presence. At the same time, this attachment to
431 justified certainty covers up the ontological value of delusion, since
432 truth is an issue of universal validity and permanent presence, instead of
433 a hermeneutic interplay of presence and absence. As Heidegger writes:

434 The fact that, even though dispositions are primarily disclosive, everyday
435 circumspection goes wrong and to a large extent succumbs to delusion
436 because of them, is a $\mu\eta\ \delta\upsilon\nu$ [non-being] when measured against the idea
437 of knowing the “world” absolutely. But if we make evaluations which
438 are so unjustified ontologically, we shall completely fail to recognize the
439 existentially positive character of the capacity for delusion. It is precisely
440 when we see the “world” unsteadily and fitfully in accordance with our
441 moods, that the ready-to-hand shows itself in its specific worldhood,
442 which is never the same from day to day. (SZ 138)

443 4.2 Heidegger’s Critique of Husserlian Evidence

444 Heidegger’s most sustained and systematic critique of Husserl’s con-
445 ception of the notion of “evidence” is found in his lecture course *IPR*,
446 delivered in the winter semester 1923/1924. In this lecture course,
447 Heidegger compares and contrasts Husserlian phenomenology with
448 Cartesian philosophy and zeroes in on the basic differences, but also—
449 crucially—what he sees as the common tendency in their philosophical
450 endeavors, what Heidegger calls the “care for certainty.” This tendency,
451 which Husserl inherits from Descartes, is responsible for an array of
452 characteristics that influence Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology
453 vis-à-vis the conception of phenomenology as a science and connected
454 methodological considerations. Specifically, the “care for certainty,”
455 which organizes both Descartes’ and Husserl’s work, is responsible for
456 the normative ideals of “certainty” and “evidence” operative in Husserl’s
457 phenomenology.

458 In what immediately follows, I will set out Heidegger’s critique of
459 Husserl’s conception of “evidence” in three parts, proceeding from the



460 general to the particular. I will explain how, according to Heidegger,
461 Husserl's phenomenology inherits the Cartesian vision of science, the
462 essence of which is the "care for certainty." As a consequence, the ideal
463 of science is that of *security*. This stems from a care for already known
464 knowledge, which imposes a need for purification that weeds out the
465 uncertain in order to achieve certainty. I will then explain how the
466 aforementioned scientific ideal results in the respective themes of the
467 "cogito" and "consciousness" as the areas of being that remain available
468 after the criteria of truth (clarity and distinctness) are put in place.⁶ I
469 will explain how, according to Heidegger, care for certainty results in
470 Husserl mangling the notion of "evidence."

471 4.2.1 Care for Certainty: Science, Knowledge and Purification

472 *IPR* is a lecture course ultimately dedicated to identifying what went
473 wrong in Husserl's "transcendental turn," in Heidegger's eyes, and to
474 preparing the ground for Heidegger's own transcendental project, which
475 has the existential analytic of Dasein as its centerpiece. Ultimately,
476 Heidegger will want to change the thematic field of phenomenology:
477 from consciousness to the meaning of Being. It is in this context that he
478 says that the course is "supposed to be nothing less than a *proper prepara-*
479 *tion for the critical encounter with what is set forth as the thematic field*
480 *in present-day phenomenology*" (*IPR* 198–199). Heidegger analyzes the
481 ways in which the Husserlian promise of a phenomenological *science*
482 ultimately succumbs to the Cartesian ideal of certainty, and shows that
483 Husserl betrays his initial phenomenological discoveries as laid down in
484 *Logical Investigations*. Heidegger's critical analysis is here mainly focused
485 on *Ideas I* and on "Philosophy as a Rigorous Science."

486 Heidegger is quite careful not to conflate Husserlian terms with
487 Cartesian notions, and he repeats several times that, for example,
488 Husserlian "consciousness" should not be conflated with the Cartesian
489 "cogito" (*ibid.*). However, "a common character obtains in spite of the
490 difference in decisive connections, a common character such that it
491 becomes apparent how Husserl, in spite of the difference, stands within
492 the uniform, basic tendency of Cartesian research, in such a way that in



493 him the care of knowledge is ultimately at work as *care about certainty*”
494 (ibid.).

495 Science, as an expression of the care for certainty, has the task of
496 *securing* not just knowledge but, as Heidegger argues, existence and cul-
497 ture (IPR 44). It is this care for security that turns the care about abso-
498 lute knowledge into epistemological security, that is, justified knowledge
499 [*gerechtfertigte Erkenntnis*] (IPR 73). According to Heidegger, the care for
500 certainty means there is no tolerance for uncertainty, and this allows for
501 the prioritization of methodology over the matter itself, and the reverse:
502 the idea of a definite sort of knowledge determines the theme, rather
503 than vice versa (IPR 34). In this way, consciousness becomes the theme of
504 phenomenological research. Yet consciousness is, in Husserl’s project, still
505 in need of a further *purification* (*Reinigung*) (IPR 38). As mentioned ear-
506 lier, the rigorousness of the natural sciences serves as the ultimate exam-
507 ple of rigorousness. But Husserl wants consciousness, which is the theme
508 of his philosophy, to be further purified, so as to “bring the scientific bias
509 to natural science radically to end,” (IPR 53) because the scientific bias
510 may make the acquisition of absolute certainty impossible (since all the
511 claims of *natural science* may be doubted). It is this purification that the
512 transcendental reduction achieves (IPR 58).

513 For Heidegger, the purification process enacted by the transcenden-
514 tal reduction (and the epoché) leaves out human existence (Dasein) and
515 temporality, and his own existential analytic of Dasein, which themat-
516 izes Dasein’s *facticity* and *thrownness*, tries to remedy this. In Heidegger’s
517 own words: “The question remains: What, then, is neglected? In this care
518 about the absolute certitude of the norm and, at the same time, about
519 elaborating a genuine lawfulness, the task of examining human existence
520 itself does not come up at all. [...] *What is neglected is what is the genuine*
521 *object of concern: human existence*” (IPR 66).

522 4.2.2 Criteria for Truth: Clarity and Distinctness

523 According to Heidegger, the “method in connection with the care for
524 certitude is [...] taken in a completely determined sense: as the path
525 to the acquisition of the greatest possible *evidence*” (IPR 92). But how



526 is evidence defined? As mentioned earlier, Descartes' justification of the
527 criterion of knowledge is connected to his definition of truth as *clear*
528 *and distinct perception*. So how does Descartes determine *clarity* and *dis-*
529 *distinctness*, which are the characteristics by virtue of which one encounters
530 the truth (*verum*)?

531 Perception must firstly be clear and then distinct. As Heidegger says,
532 the "perceptum is such that it is grasped by a manner of *grasping explic-*
533 *itly* aimed at it, by a *mens attendens* [mind attending] to the sort of
534 grasping that is at work where the aim is to get a hold of what is to be
535 grasped in itself" (*IPR* 154–155). The perceptum must be there *present*
536 and *exposed* (*ibid.*). Heidegger interprets it thus: the perceptum must in
537 any case be "*lying there in the open*, the entity existing there in itself,
538 such that it is in no way concealed, is not indirectly given itself" (*ibid.*).
539 In other words: it must be there fully present. Remember that this is
540 how Husserl also defined evidence in *Ideas I*. According to the Principle
541 of All Principles, in *originary intuition* thought and thing coincide, and
542 this coincidence is what constitutes evidence, what constitutes fulfill-
543 ment and presence, what guarantees presence.

544 But clarity is not enough on its own for true perception—we also
545 need distinctness, which is an added condition: while there are some
546 clear perceptions that are not distinct, there are no distinct percep-
547 tions that are not clear, since "distinctness is a factor founded on the
548 clarity" (*IPR* 156). Heidegger recalls Descartes' example of a clear but
549 non-distinct perception: non-localized pain. "If someone feels a great
550 pain, then he has the pain as existing and has it in an absolutely clear
551 but not always distinct way. [...] Here, to be sure, the pain is given in
552 an absolutely clear way, but it is not given distinctly" (*ibid.*). It is impor-
553 tant to take note of this example, because it shows that Heideggerian
554 moods [*Stimmungen*] would not fulfill the Cartesian (and Husserlian)
555 criteria for evidence, since moods, like pain, are not distinct entities.

556 4.2.3 The Mangling of Evidence

557 Despite the differences between Husserl and Descartes, Heidegger
558 argues, their philosophies share the same tendency: the care for certainty.



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559 In trying to fight historicism and achieve his transcendental turn,
560 Husserl adopts the Cartesian tendency (the care for certainty) and
561 betrays his most important phenomenological discoveries. Heidegger
562 becomes very critical of the transcendental turn, as he believes it mangles
563 Husserl's earlier fundamental phenomenological discoveries. According
564 to Heidegger, Husserl mangles the notion of evidence. For the purposes
565 of this chapter, in order to understand what Heidegger means in saying
566 that Husserl mangles the notion of evidence, it is best to consider it in
567 relation to two other connected phenomena Heidegger thinks Husserl
568 distorts: intentionality and affective life.

569 As regards intentionality, Husserl's care for certainty distorts his ini-
570 tial discovery of intentionality in the following way. Intentionality is
571 always—either explicitly or implicitly—construed as a specific *theoret-*
572 *ical* behavior, and it is characteristically translated as meaning: intend-
573 ing something [*Meinen*], i.e. *theoretically knowing* something (*IPR*
574 209). This way of interpreting intentionality distorts the intentional
575 *life* of a subject; for example, it obscures the way intentionality itself is
576 infused with feeling. Husserl's reflective method devivifies intentional
577 life, posing the problem of the constitution of intentional life in a way
578 that suppresses (and distorts) the vital grounds of this life. Heidegger
579 is interested in showing how intentional life—intentionality in all its
580 forms and variations—is grounded in the affective. It is in this context
581 that Heidegger begins his analysis of intentional life, by prioritizing the
582 enactment [*Vollzug*] of life. Intentional life *is* enactment, a praxis that is
583 affectively determined.

584 Husserl's care for certainty fixes his gaze in such a way that his analy-
585 sis prefigures intentionality as theoretical knowing. As Heidegger writes:

586 Through this fixing of usage, a definite prefiguration of perspective creeps
587 into every intentional analysis. This is explicitly evident from the fact
588 that it is expressly claimed that for every intentional context of a com-
589 plicated sort, theoretically meaning something forms the foundation,
590 that each judgment, each instance of wanting, each instance of loving is
591 founded upon a presenting [*Vorstellen*] that provides in advance what can
592 be wanted, what is detestable and loveable. This transformation lies in
593 the fact that the prevailing study of intentionality is itself oriented to the
594 intention in knowing. (ibid.)



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595 As a consequence, Husserl's analysis also distorts emotional acts
596 themselves (for example, an act of loving), which are reduced to acts of
597 theoretical knowing and taken to be founded on presenting [*Vorstellen*].
598 According to Heidegger, however, it is "a methodical misunderstanding
599 to make the investigation of emotional experiences simply analogous
600 to knowing" (ibid.). The distortion that takes place here, a distortion
601 that is a basic phenomenon of the care for certainty, is a phenomenon
602 determined as *reflection*. Recall that for Husserl, it is phenomenological
603 reflection that is the secure source of evidence. Following the epoché,
604 the source of authority for knowledge is, according to the Principle of
605 All Principles, *originary intuition*, in which thought and thing coin-
606 cide, and this coincidence is what constitutes evidence, fulfillment and
607 presence. But for Heidegger, it is precisely reflection that *distorts*; it dis-
608 torts affective phenomena such as anxiety, joy, terror, etc. In Heidegger's
609 words:

610 This basic phenomenon of distorting, a basic phenomenon that has long
611 been determined as reflection, is seen here concretely and, indeed, in
612 terms of a preview of the structure of existence's being as such. For us this
613 phenomenon has the character of a methodic clue, insofar as, viewed from
614 its vantage point, the basic character of consciousness, the *intentionality*, is
615 cut down to size and led back to its limits, to the *limits of its interpretative*
616 *function*. At the same time this phenomenon is the structural ground on
617 which such phenomena as joy, terror, sadness, anxiety can be explicated—
618 phenomena that are overlooked if they are determined as intentionality.
619 I cannot grasp the phenomenon of anxiety as a manner of being-relat-
620 ed-to-something; it is instead a phenomenon of existence itself. (*IPR* 220)

621 This distortion of affective phenomena is key to understanding why, for
622 Heidegger, they provide evidence for truth, whereas Husserl suppresses,
623 ignores, or entirely dismisses their evidentiary value. As a result, Husserl
624 mangles the notion of *evidence*.

625 Heidegger notes that evidence plays a fundamental role in phe-
626 nomenology and that what Husserl says about evidence "is far supe-
627 rior to everything else that has ever been said about it and that he
628 has placed the matter on a suitable basis for the first time" (*IPR* 210).



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629 Evidence is interpreted as coincidence of what is meant and what is
630 grasped in itself, and “evidence itself is normatively determined by
631 indisputability and disputability, analogous to the way the cogito sum is
632 normatively determined by the principle of contradiction” (ibid.).

633 Evidence is therefore “a *specific sort of evidence for grasping and deter-*
634 *mining*, a specific sort of evidence that is transposed, by way of analogy,
635 to the remaining manners of behavior and their evidence. It is trans-
636 posed in such a way that Husserl sees that each object-domain, corre-
637 sponding to its inherent content, has a specific sort of evidence” (ibid.).
638 According to Heidegger, Husserl’s phenomenology, just like Descartes’
639 philosophy, “has also been *guided by the predominance of an empty and*
640 *thereby fantastic idea of certainty and evidence*. This predominance of a
641 specific idea of evidence predominates *over every genuine effort to free up*
642 *the possibility of encountering the genuine matters of philosophy*. Care about
643 a specific, *absolute knowledge*, taken purely as an idea, predominates over
644 every question about the matters that are decisive” (IPR 33).

645 4.3 Evidence in *Being and Time*

646 In *BT*, affective phenomena are manifested in the notions of disposition
647 [*Befindlichkeit*] and mood [*Stimmung*]. Moods constitute a distinct
648 faculty of existence; they are *necessary conditions* for the constitution of
649 understanding and the capacity to judge. It is via moods that the world
650 is meaningful for us. Hence, moods are essential to any normative
651 notion of “authenticity.”

652 In *BT*, “authenticity” [*Eigentlichkeit*] is the achievement of resolute
653 self-transparency, a comportment that embraces existential anxiety
654 (Angst) and reveals the deep temporal essence of Dasein. But anxiety
655 also serves a crucial methodological function: in revealing the deeper
656 structures of Dasein, anxiety is *evidence* for ontological understanding.⁷
657 Ascribing to moods such an “epistemic role” means that Heidegger’s
658 phenomenology is in tension with Husserl’s when it comes to the
659 problem of evidence. For Husserl, phenomenology cannot be meth-
660 odologically grounded in any sort of feeling, because feeling cannot
661 count as evidence for knowledge; in fact, when Husserl elaborates on



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662 his conception of “evidence,” he explicitly develops his own definition
663 in opposition to the notion of the “feeling of evidence” [*Evidenzgefühl*].

664 In *BT*, Heidegger provides an “existential analytic of Dasein,” in
665 which he describes and interprets the constitutive states of Dasein qua
666 Being-in-the-world. The ultimate aim of the book is to lay open the
667 horizon of Dasein’s understanding of Being. Heidegger analyzes how
668 Dasein understands Being and how Dasein is the site of the truth of
669 Being. Heidegger sees Dasein as *in* truth—Dasein understands the truth
670 of Being, even though most of the time it covers up this understanding
671 with inauthentic misinterpretation. Insofar as Dasein is in truth, this
672 means that Dasein’s own way of being must “have” evidence of truth,
673 even amid the inauthentic edifices—hence, the evidentiary operation of
674 Dasein’s basic existential structure must be analyzed.

675 In this context, Heidegger identifies two equiprimordial ways in
676 which the “there” of Dasein is constituted: “disposition” [*Befindlichkeit*]
677 and “understanding” [*Verstehen*].⁸ Equiprimordiality means that disposi-
678 tion always has its understanding, even if it merely keeps it suppressed,
679 and understanding always has its mood (SZ 142–143). Disposition
680 refers to the affective character of Dasein, the way it finds itself thrown
681 in the world, which is manifested in moods.

682 Heidegger’s twofold description of Being-In (-the-world) goes
683 against traditional cognitive-mentalist interpretations of human know-
684 ing/understanding. According to Heidegger, “the phenomenon of
685 Being-in has for the most part been represented exclusively by a single
686 exemplar—knowing the world,” (SZ 59) which is a derivative mode
687 of Being-in-the-world. Here, Heidegger is going against not only
688 Descartes but also the Husserlian mentalist approach to knowledge.

689 To begin with, Heidegger dismisses the idea that Dasein is ever with-
690 out a mood. As he says, even the “pallid, evenly balanced lack of mood
691 [*Ungestimmtheit*], which is often persistent and which is not to be mis-
692 taken for a bad mood, is far from nothing at all” (SZ 134). Even in
693 this seeming “lack of mood,” its being-there has already been disclosed
694 in a particular way: as a burden. The “lack of mood” discloses the bur-
695 densome character of Dasein’s facticity, which is a basic character of its
696 being that “we cannot come across by beholding it [*Anschauen*].” Mood
697 is therefore that by virtue of which facticity is revealed (SZ 135).



698 Mood “brings Dasein before itself,” and through mood Dasein “finds
699 itself” in a peculiar way, which extends beyond the scope or capaci-
700 ties of perception: mood discloses not in the way of “looking” but in
701 “turning towards or turning away” [*An- und Ab-kehr*] (ibid.). In other
702 words, mood reveals the truth of Dasein’s being not in the way percep-
703 tion grasps a phenomenon that is present-at-hand, or in the way a valid
704 judgment reveals something true, but rather as one directs oneself either
705 toward or away from something as either pleasing or displeasing.

706 Disposition, for Heidegger, discloses Being-in-the-world as a whole,
707 because it discloses significance itself; it discloses the way the world *matters*,
708 the way the world is organized as a meaningful whole. Because of dispo-
709 sition’s power to disclose, Heidegger’s analytic takes affects very seriously:
710 disposition is, in his own words, “methodologically significant in principle
711 for the existential analytic” (SZ 139). Disposition discloses the world qua
712 world—that is, it discloses the world as possibility. Specifically, it discloses
713 the “world” as “a totality of involvements,” a “categorical whole of a *possible*
714 interconnection of the ready-to-hand” (SZ 144).

715 4.4 Angst: The Authentic Certainty of Resoluteness

716 Throughout this chapter, I have depicted both Husserl’s and Heidegger’s
717 projects as seeking to establish a firm footing for phenomenological
718 findings by setting normative standards according to which their
719 phenomenological findings will be grounded in evidence. Their aim is
720 to ensure that their phenomenological findings are justified. Husserl
721 devises the Principle of All Principles, which purifies consciousness and
722 guarantees that phenomenological reflection provides *evidence* for tran-
723 scendental knowledge. Here, evidence is identified with self-giveness,
724 with clarity and distinction, which can supply the necessary (apodictic)
725 certainty. Heidegger rejects Husserl’s methodological position. His own
726 normative criterion is “resoluteness.” The notion of resoluteness pro-
727 vides a different answer to the question of what can provide certainty
728 and evidence, and in this context, Heidegger argues that Angst, which is
729 an existential feeling, provides the ultimate evidence that justifies, even
730 if tentatively, ontological understanding and the formally indicative
731 interpretation of *BT*.



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732 For Heidegger, *resoluteness* is an existential (“*existentiell*”) possibility
733 for Dasein that attests to Dasein’s authentic potentiality-for-Being (SZ
734 301–302). Dasein’s authentic potentiality-for-Being is a phenomenon
735 grounded in *anticipation*, which amounts to Dasein’s authentic potenti-
736 ality-for-Being-a-whole, i.e. Dasein’s authentic Being-towards-death. In
737 being resolute, Dasein authentically anticipates its own death: Dasein is
738 authentically *anxious*. What is the significance of death? What is achieved
739 by anticipating death, and why is it important? Heidegger defines
740 death thus: “*death, as the end of Dasein, is Dasein’s ownmost possibility—*
741 *non-relational, certain and as such indefinite, not to be outstripped. Death is,*
742 *as Dasein’s end, in the Being of this entity towards its end*” (SZ 258–259).
743 What does resoluteness therefore achieve? On the one hand, in anticipa-
744 tory resoluteness “[t]emporality *gets experienced in a phenomenally primor-*
745 *dial way*” (SZ 304) and is a distinctive mode of temporality that brings
746 Dasein “before the primordial *truth* of existence” (SZ 307). On the other
747 hand, it achieves *certainty*. The attainment of certainty is crucial here and
748 as such it calls for further analysis.

749 How does resoluteness achieve certainty? Resoluteness involves the
750 reticent “projecting oneself upon one’s ownmost Being-guilty, and
751 *exacting anxiety of oneself*” (SZ 305; my emphasis). Insofar as resolute-
752 ness involves the attainment of certainty, and this certainty is achieved
753 by “exacting anxiety,” *it follows that anxiety is the evidence that grounds*
754 *the understanding involved in the truth of resoluteness*. What remains to
755 be answered, now, is the question of how this certainty differs from
756 Husserlian apodictic certainty, and what counts as evidence for it.

757 In *BT*, Heidegger distinguishes between authentic certainty and
758 inauthentic certainty, each of which involves maintaining oneself in
759 the truth that has been revealed. The immediate truth that has been
760 revealed in Being-towards-death is the death of Dasein: Dasein is
761 certain of its own death. Inauthentic certainty of death involves an
762 inauthentic way of encountering the event of death, which involves
763 the expectation of a future event as a *matter of fact*. This is inauthentic
764 certainty because it maintains itself in the truth of an event present-
765 at-hand in an indifferent, “purely objective” manner—much like the
766 empirical certainty of apodictic evidence, whereby a truth is disclosed
767 as certain because its opposite is logically inconceivable. Authentic cer-
768 tainty, on the other hand, is another kind of certainty, the certainty of



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769 *Being-certain*, which is more primordial, and for which Angst is the pri-
770 mary evidence. In Heidegger's own words:

771 To maintain oneself in this truth—that is, to be certain of what has been
772 disclosed—demands all the more that one should anticipate. We cannot
773 compute the certainty of death by ascertaining how many cases of death
774 we encounter. This certainty is by no means of the kind which maintains
775 itself in the truth of the present-at-hand. When something present-at-
776 hand has been uncovered, it is encountered most purely if we just look at
777 the entity and let it be encountered in itself. Dasein must first have lost
778 itself in the factual circumstances [*Sachverhalte*] (this can be one of care's
779 own tasks and possibilities) if it is to obtain the pure objectivity—that is
780 to say, the indifference—of apodictic evidence. If Being-certain in rela-
781 tion to death does not have this character, this does not mean that it is
782 of a lower grade, but that *it does not belong at all to the graded order of the*
783 *kinds of evidence we can have about the present-at-hand.* (SZ 264–265)

784 To maintain oneself in the truth of authentic certainty, therefore—
785 what Heidegger calls “Being-certain”—Dasein ought to rely on a
786 different sort of evidence, rather than rely on the reflection of the
787 apodictic reduction: it must rely on Angst. Angst is evidence for the
788 understanding of death as a possibility, which is the “possibility of
789 impossibility of existence” (SZ 262).

790 It takes a lot of courage to accept the evidence of Angst—a courage
791 that “they” will not let Dasein have. In fact, the “they” concerns itself with
792 transforming this anxiety into fear in the face of an oncoming event. In
793 addition, the anxiety which has been made ambiguous as fear, is passed off
794 as a weakness with which no self-assured Dasein may have any acquaint-
795 ance” (SZ 254) and is thus banished from the “epistemological frame”.

796 Heidegger's rehabilitation of moods, of existential feeling, radicalizes
797 not only the notion of certainty, but also the notion of evidence. In *BT*,
798 Angst is the ultimate evidence of the authentic understanding of the
799 meaning of Being. In Heidegger's words:

800 All understanding is accompanied by a disposition. Dasein's mood brings
801 it face to face with the thrownness of its “that it is there.” *But the dis-*
802 *position which can hold open the utter and constant threat to itself arising*



803 *from Dasein's ownmost individualized Being, is anxiety.* In this disposition,
804 Dasein finds itself *face to face* with the “nothing” of the possible impossi-
805 bility of its existence. Anxiety is anxious *about* the potentiality-for-Being
806 of the entity so destined [*des so bestimmten Seienden*], and in this way it
807 discloses the uttermost possibility. (SZ 265–256)

808 5 Angst and Mentalist Evidentialism

809 As I have been arguing, the specific role that Angst plays in *BT* marks
810 an epistemic shift in phenomenology, in which Heidegger radicalizes
811 Husserl's phenomenology, which is committed to mentalist evidentialism.⁹
812 In this final section, I will explain why Heidegger's position in *BT* com-
813 mits him to a sort of quasi-evidentialism that is incompatible with men-
814 talism and internalism. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to provide a
815 positive definition of Heidegger's own position in contemporary epistemo-
816 logical terms (if that's even possible). However, I hope to have paved the
817 way for more work to be done on this issue in the near future.

818 *BT*, while being a quasi-evidentialist project, moves phenomenol-
819 ogy away from (Husserlian) mentalist evidentialism. The epistemic
820 principles of phenomenology are shifted away from mentalist eviden-
821 tialism insofar as: (a) Heidegger lambasts Husserl's phenomenology for
822 prioritizing epistemology over ontology and rejects his epistemological
823 notion of “certainty”; (b) Angst, which serves the role of “evidence” in
824 *BT*, is not a “mental state”, unlike Husserlian originary intuition; and
825 (c) Angst is not “internal” to Dasein (unlike originary intuition to the
826 subject). Insofar as mentalist evidentialism is an internalist theory of
827 justification (because mental states are internal to the subject), *BT* is
828 incompatible with mentalist evidentialism.

829 As regards (a), *BT*'s quasi-evidentialism, it is useful to recall what was
830 mentioned in Sect. 2 of this chapter: Heideggerian phenomenology is
831 indeed a foundationalist project, which tries to ground transcendental
832 interpretation in evidence. In this context, resoluteness and authenticity
833 respond to the demand for evidential responsibility. Ultimately, Dasein
834 needs phenomenological evidence in order to justify ontological insights
835 about its own structure and the meaning of Being. Having said that,



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836 as mentioned earlier, Heidegger remains critical of any prioritization of
837 methodology over matter, indeed of epistemology itself (and of the idea
838 of “justified knowledge”) and specifically of Husserl’s and Descartes’
839 fixation on certainty, insofar as certainty guarantees indisputability
840 of knowledge. This principle of certainty is fantastical, according to
841 Heidegger. In *BT*, Heidegger identifies this sort of certainty as inau-
842 thentic, because it relies on the objectivity of presence-at-hand. For this
843 reason, it is difficult to call Heidegger an evidentialist, in any standard
844 understanding of the term. However, he needs to retain a positive use
845 of the notions of certainty and evidence in what he calls “authentic
846 certainty”, which is more primordial, incomputable and non-apodictic.
847 Without this commitment to evidence and certainty, Heidegger’s
848 project would collapse because it would lose its phenomenological
849 coherence. For these reasons, I call Heidegger a quasi-evidentialist.

850 As regards (b), the fact that *Angst* is not a mental state. While
851 Macquarrie and Robinson translate *Befindlichkeit* as “state-of-mind”
852 in their 1962 translation of *BT*, *Befindlichkeit* is neither a “state”, nor
853 does it refer to a “mind” (or anything “mental”). “Disposition” is a more
854 appropriate translation as this concept conveys the sense of situatedness
855 in an enviroing world, and also has the sense of findingness (being
856 disposed is how one finds oneself “available”). What *Befindlichkeit*
857 (and *Stimmung*) are, and why they do not refer to “mental states”, will
858 become clearer once we see what phenomena they indicate. Moods dis-
859 close Dasein’s *thrownness* [*Geworfenheit*]. Heidegger elaborates on the
860 phenomenon of thrownness by referring to the phenomenon of *facticity*
861 [*Faktizität*].¹⁰ As he says: “The expression ‘thrownness’ is meant to
862 suggest the *facticity of its being delivered over*” (*SZ* 135). But what is fac-
863 ticity? It is not the “state-of-affairs” or “matters of fact”—these are ontic
864 phenomena, which can indeed be grasped by intuition. As Heidegger
865 says in §29 in *BT*, thrownness is “the ‘that-it-is’ of facticity [which]
866 never becomes something that we can come across by beholding
867 it” (*SZ* 135).¹¹ Disposition discloses facticity in a manner whereby it
868 remains an “inexorable enigma,” which cannot be measured against the
869 “apodictic certainty of a theoretical cognition of something” (*SZ* 136).¹²

870 How does disposition disclose the facticity of being-there?
871 Dispositions disclose mostly in the manner of evasive “turning away”



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872 (ibid.). In Heidegger's own words: "the *first* essential characteristic of dis-
873 positions [is] that *they disclose Dasein in its thrownness, and—proximally*
874 *and for the most part—in the manner of an evasive turning-away*" (ibid.;
875 translation modified). Dasein's thrownness can only be revealed in a par-
876 ticular way: it is a *finding* of one's "there", not through a direct percep-
877 tive seeking, but rather primarily through the movement of "fleeing"
878 (SZ 135). The way mood discloses the "there" of Dasein is not through
879 "beholding" [*Anschauen*]¹³; rather, it discloses being-there as kinesis, in
880 a dynamic and pre-conceptual way: the "there" is disclosed as a "turning
881 towards" or "turning away" from something [*An- und Abkehr*].¹⁴ Facticity
882 is therefore the *becoming* of Da-Sein, the *being of becoming*, which is
883 inherently transient and "unsettled." For these reasons, mood, which is
884 the primary manifestation of facticity and thrownness, is not a state of
885 mind because it is neither a "state" (since it is not something that is pres-
886 ent and actual), nor is it part of the "mind" since it is precognitive and
887 "felt" by the moving body, barely grasped by the faculty of the mind.

888 As regards (c), Angst is not internal to a subject (nor is it internal to
889 Dasein, for that matter). Angst is a mood [*Stimmung*], and moods are
890 the basic way in which disposition [*Befindlichkeit*] is manifested. It is
891 crucial to understand why *Befindlichkeit* is neither a mental state nor a
892 phenomenon internal to a subject. Disposition and fundamental moods
893 are neither subjective nor objective, but rather are "in-between" the sub-
894 ject and the object, between the internal and the external. Fundamental
895 mood is neither about the subject nor about an object—it reveals the
896 "there" in a pre-intentional way. As Heidegger says, mood is something
897 that *assails* us but it comes *neither from the "inside" nor from the "outside"*
898 (SZ 136). Heidegger's phenomenology of mood therefore is crucial for
899 his rejection of the subject-object model of understanding the rela-
900 tionship between human and world (see Freeman 2014). As Stephen
901 Mulhall aptly puts it, "[m]oods are an aspect of Dasein's existence and
902 hence an aspect of Being-in-the-world, and so they are revelatory of the
903 world as they are of Dasein" (Mulhall 1996, 194). A mood arises out
904 of Being-in-the-World, and this is why it cannot be said to come either
905 from the "outside" or from the "inside" (SZ 136).

906 Angst reveals self and world in their togetherness: it reveals the
907 thrownness of Dasein into the world. Angst is therefore evidence for



908 Being-in-the-world as a whole, and that refers to not just that in the face
909 *of* which the anxious person is anxious, but also that *for* which he or she
910 is anxious: itself. Angst is part and parcel of Heidegger's response to, as
911 Stephen Crowell notes, "Husserl's residual individualism, rationalism (the-
912 oretism), and internalism" (Crowell 2013, 67). The appeal to affective
913 evidence is a way of capturing Dasein's openness to the world in a non-
914 representationalist manner that undercuts consciousness as the ground of
915 intentionality, since it construes knowledge (openness) "as a kind of *forum*
916 *internum*" (Crowell 2013, 69). As Crowell says, "Heidegger's analysis of
917 affectedness—of the passivity and finitude of being-in-the-world—would
918 seem to contest such internalism" (Crowell 2013, 71).

919 6 Concluding Remark

920 I have argued that while *BT* continues Husserl's modernist project that
921 aims to ground ontological interpretation in phenomenological evi-
922 dence, Heidegger radicalizes the basic concept of "evidence" operative in
923 Husserlian phenomenology.

924 For Husserl, it is *originary intuition* that serves as *apodictically certain*
925 *evidence*. Husserl's position is akin to mentalist evidentialism, comply-
926 ing with its basic tenets, namely that justification is determined by the
927 quality of the believer's evidence, and that evidence is internal to the
928 person's mental life (in other words: evidence consists in mental states).

929 Heidegger criticizes Husserl's phenomenology precisely on account
930 of the fact that it was guided by an empty and fantastic idea of cer-
931 tainty and evidence. In *BT*, it is Angst that plays the crucial methodo-
932 logical function of evidence upon which the ontological interpretation
933 gained by the existential analytic of Dasein is grounded. Heidegger
934 repeatedly juxtaposes the kind of evidence supplied by Angst with
935 the kind of evidence supplied by the apodictic certainty of originary
936 intuition. This makes Heidegger's own epistemic principles incom-
937 patible with Husserl's. While Heidegger remains committed to a sort
938 of quasi-evidentialism, his position is fundamentally incompatible
939 with Husserl's mentalist evidentialism: Angst cannot be reduced to an
940 internal condition, and it cannot be reduced to a mental state either.



941 What is more, it is precisely through fundamental moods, such as
942 Angst, that Heidegger's phenomenology in *BT* indicates a phenomenon
943 that overcomes the internal-external dualism, and also overcomes the
944 mentalism characteristic of Husserl's phenomenology.

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949 comments on past versions of this chapter. I would also to thank Bence
950 Marosan for recommending key literature on Husserl's notion of evidence,
951 during a conversation we had in Warsaw in 2017.

952 Notes

- 953 1. While Heidegger's relationship with Husserl was complex and not
954 as straightforward as one of loyalty, respect and admiration, with
955 Heidegger praising Husserl in his presence but lambasting him in his
956 absence (i.e. behind his back), I still think that there is a certain dis-
957 cursive and intellectual honesty in the dedication, precisely because he
958 knew that Husserl would have been surprised by the ways in which *BT*
959 departs from his own method.
- 960 2. I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for useful feedback on
961 this issue.
- 962 3. For Husserl's mentalism, see Philipp Berghofer's recent articles: Philipp
963 Berghofer, "Husserl's Conception of Experiential Justification: What It
964 Is and Why It Matters," *Husserl Studies* 34 (2018): 145–170; Philipp
965 Berghofer, "Towards a Phenomenological Conception of Experiential
966 Justification," *Synthese* (2018), <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1744-5>; and Philipp Berghofer, "On the Nature and Systematic Role
967 of Evidence: Husserl as a Proponent of Mentalist Evidentialism?"
968 *European Journal of Philosophy* (2018): 1–20, [https://doi.org/10.1111/](https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12405)
969 [ejop.12405](https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12405).
- 970 4. For a critical discussion of Husserl's (non-)foundationalism, see Walter
971 Hopp, "Husserl, Phenomenology, and Foundationalism," *Inquiry* 51,
972 no. 2 (2008): 194–216; Dagfinn Føllesdal, "Husserl on Evidence and
973 Justification," in *Edmund Husserl and the Phenomenological Tradition*,
- 974



ed. Robert Sokolowski (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1988), 107–129; and Philipp Berghofer, “Why Husserl Is a Moderate Foundationalist,” *Husserl Studies* 34 (2018): 1–23, <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10743-017-9213-4>.

5. In §40 of *BT*, Heidegger says that disposition and understanding enable Dasein to disclose to itself “information” about itself as an entity. Anxiety is a distinctive mood because in anxiety Dasein gets brought before its own Being; Anxiety reveals the Being of the totality of the structural whole (SZ 184).
6. *clara et distincta perception*.
7. In her article, “The Methodological Role of Angst in *Being and Time*,” *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* 43, no. 2 (2012): 195–211, Katherine Withy argues that while Angst is usually understood as part of an ontological story about the fragility of meaning and the pertinent ontological risk involved, specifically connecting to an ethical-existential dimension of *BT*, it would be more helpful to approach Angst from a methodological perspective, namely from the perspective of the methodological role (Heidegger says) it plays. As Withy writes: “We analyse angst because it has to do not with how we lead our lives generally, but specifically with how we do philosophy” (ibid., 195). Thus, we are enabled to see the positive valence Angst has: “Angst is an experience within a life that provides genuine ontological insight into what it takes to lead a life” thus revealing “something that we cannot access otherwise, and which is crucial for Heidegger’s phenomenological project” (ibid., 196). What Angst does, then, is to resolve a serious methodological problem that Heidegger faces: to phenomenologically reveal the structural unity of our being (ibid., 199).
8. While Macquarrie and Robinson translate *Befindlichkeit* as “state-of-mind,” I opt for “disposition.” (See Hadjioannou 2015). In their article “Affectivity in Heidegger I,” *Philosophy Compass* 10, no. 10 (2015): 661–671, Andreas Elpidorou and Lauren Freeman provide a comprehensive account of how *Befindlichkeit* has been translated into English by various scholars, and rightly argue that no translation is really *adequate* to the German notion. Hence, they opt to leave *Befindlichkeit* untranslated.

Whilst I agree that the safest option is to leave the word untranslated, I still think that we can translate it as “disposition.” Elpidorou



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1012 and Freeman are right in saying that Macquarrie and Robinson's (1962)
1013 use of the phrase "state-of-mind" is problematic since *Befindlichkeit*
1014 is philosophically neither a "state", nor does it refer to a "mind"; this
1015 is the most misleading translation of all, from a *literal* point of view.
1016 However, "state-of-mind" is an actual expression in everyday English
1017 that would be semantically equivalent to *Befindlichkeit*. Hence, if we
1018 are to stick to the phenomenological principle of starting from expres-
1019 sions used in everydayness, and use words said from *οἱ πολλοί*, as well
1020 as the hermeneutic principle of starting from the more familiar and
1021 moving to the least familiar, then "state-of-mind" is not such an inap-
1022 propriate term. But it does introduce significant problems once the
1023 ontological analysis proceeds.

1024 Haugeland uses "findingness," whilst he had also used "sofind-
1025 ingness" (2013), without noting the drawbacks of these renderings. I
1026 think that whilst "findingness" is indeed the most linguistically accurate
1027 translation into English, since it is constructed from the same root verb
1028 *finden*, it is psychologically dry and relays a neutral spatiality, and is also
1029 too static. It does reveal the factual aspect though (the sense of "inher-
1030 itance"). In addition, it sounds awkward in English. Elpidorou and
1031 Freeman then note how Guignon (1984) uses "situatedness," dismiss-
1032 ing it because it lacks the important sense of *finden* in *Befindlichkeit*.
1033 I would add that whilst "situatedness" as a category is indeed linked
1034 to *Befindlichkeit*, translating the latter as "situatedness" risks conflating
1035 *Befindlichkeit* with another notion, that of *Situation*. *Situation*
1036 (as well as *Lage*) are not basic existentials of Being-in-the-World;
1037 they are closed-off for the inauthentic Dasein, but they are disclosed
1038 to the resolute Dasein. *Situation* has its foundations in resoluteness
1039 [*Entschlossenheit*] (see *BT* §60), which may or may not be enacted,
1040 whereas *Befindlichkeit* is a basic existential that is always already there
1041 since it is a condition of possibility of Dasein. In sum, translating
1042 *Befindlichkeit* as "situatedness" is too close to committing a categorical
1043 mistake, according to the inner logic of *BT*.

1044 Elpidorou and Freeman then note how Dreyfus (1991), Blattner
1045 (2007), and Crowell (2013) all translate *Befindlichkeit* as "affectedness"
1046 or "affectivity." They rightly argue that this captures the notion that
1047 Dasein is always already affected by and feels things, which is an impor-
1048 tant element of *Befindlichkeit*. The drawback of these notions though,
1049 they argue, is that they call to mind Kant's notion of "receptivity"



1050 and thus import the very subject/object distinction that Heidegger
1051 attempts to overturn. Whilst they are right in their sensitivity to any
1052 notion that imports the subject/object distinction which *Befindlichkeit*
1053 is meant to overcome, I cannot see why the issue of receptivity is par-
1054 ticularly reminiscent of Kant and not, say, Plato's *πάσχειν*. In any case,
1055 whilst *Befindlichkeit* is indeed, from a historical perspective, Heidegger's
1056 way of making sense of what have been historically termed as "affec-
1057 tive phenomena", he himself does not want to reduce *Befindlichkeit* to
1058 *Affekt*. In fact, in *BT* Heidegger explicitly writes that these "phenom-
1059 ena [associated with *Befindlichkeit*] have long been well-known ontic-
1060 ally under the terms 'affects' and 'feelings' and have always been under
1061 consideration in philosophy" (§29), and then goes on to mention Plato
1062 and Aristotle on *πάθη*, the Scholastics, as well as volition and other
1063 accounts that take affects to be of epiphenomenal character. So "affec-
1064 tivity" is indeed inadequate, as Elpidorou and Freeman argue, but for
1065 more reasons than the ones they invoke. What is more, *Befindlichkeit*
1066 is indeed something more than affect, precisely because *Befindlichkeit*
1067 is, philosophically speaking, more than a *passive being affected*: it is
1068 also about *having a comportment*, in the sense that it requires a certain,
1069 even minimal, (relational) enactment that *relates* to an other. For this
1070 reason, "disposition" is, in my opinion, the best option for translat-
1071 ing *Befindlichkeit*. Elpidorou and Freeman note that Carman (2003),
1072 Dahlstrom (2001), and Wrathall (2001) all use "disposition" or "dis-
1073 posedness", but they think that this is not a good word because it sug-
1074 gests more of an ontic state than an ontological structure, and thus fails
1075 to adequately convey *Befindlichkeit's* ontological depth. In this con-
1076 text, they invoke Haugeland's (2013) argument that "disposition" risks
1077 implying subjectivity as well as conflicts with an established philosophi-
1078 cal usage of the term, and carries behavioral connotations.

1079 Whilst I share these concerns to a certain extent, I still think that
1080 "disposition" is a suitable translation of *Befindlichkeit*. I cannot see why
1081 "disposition" (and its cognates) fails to render ontological depth. In
1082 principle, any notion whatsoever can be ontologically reduced and con-
1083 vey ontological depth. The fact that "disposition" is an already estab-
1084 lished philosophical term is not a sufficient reason for avoiding the
1085 word, since phenomenology in general offers the potential for appropri-
1086 ation and radicalization of any given notion, in a way that could free it
1087 from its baggage, based on phenomenological evidence. After all, if we



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1088 are to accept Haugeland's argument, then even the very word *Dasein*
1089 already has an established philosophical usage in the German Idealist
1090 tradition, but that did not stop Heidegger from using it and offer-
1091 ing a phenomenological ontology of *Dasein*. As regards the behavioral
1092 connotations of "disposition", again, as long as an ontological reduc-
1093 tion is in place, then that should not be a problem. Besides, the very
1094 same issue of "behaviorism" can be raised for other pertinent notions as
1095 well, for example the notion of *Verhalten*, which in everyday German
1096 means "behavior", or *Haltung*, which would normally be translated as
1097 "attitude" or "posture", or *Verfassung*, which would normally be trans-
1098 lated as "state" or "condition", but that did not stop Heidegger from
1099 using these words. Granted, the notion of *Befindlichkeit* did fall prey
1100 to an anthropological interpretation, along with other notions used
1101 in *BT*, and that might have contributed to Heidegger's favoring of
1102 *Stimmung* in his future work. But still, the behavioral connotations of
1103 *Befindlichkeit* cannot constitute a sufficient reason for Heidegger's gen-
1104 eral replacement of *Befindlichkeit* with *Stimmung* (and *Gestimmtheit*)
1105 since if that were the case he should have also minimized the usage of
1106 several other notions, such as the notions of *Verhalten* and *Haltung*.
1107 So the behavioral connotations of a notion in themselves should not
1108 be a reason for avoiding such a notion. "Disposition" is an appropri-
1109 ate translation of *Befindlichkeit*, as it is a word that can account for the
1110 foundation of "affective phenomena", it conveys the sense of situated-
1111 ness in an enviroing world, and it also has the sense of findingness
1112 (being disposed is how one find themselves "available"), without reduc-
1113 ing it to sheer passivity but seeing it as a kind of comportment. It is a
1114 word that conveys how *Dasein* is "positioned" in the world, and how
1115 it is oriented in it. In addition, it is a word in everyday English that
1116 precisely refers to what *Befindlichkeit* also refers to in everyday German.
1117 Another reason why we should translate *Befindlichkeit* as "disposition"
1118 is that Heidegger himself on a couple of occasions uses the French word
1119 *Disposition*, in order to refer to the same phenomenon. Finally, a genea-
1120 logical account of the notion of *Befindlichkeit* in *BT* makes it clear that
1121 this is how he rendered the Aristotelian category of $\delta\iota\acute{\alpha}\theta\epsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$, a word
1122 whose best translation in English is indeed "disposition." If one accepts
1123 the "Aristotelian reading" of *BT*, then one has to accept the homology
1124 between *Befindlichkeit* and $\delta\iota\acute{\alpha}\theta\epsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$ (see Hadjioannou 2013).



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1125 Elpidorou and Freeman finally note how Stambaugh (1996) trans-
1126 lates *Befindlichkeit* as “attunement” and note that the problem with this
1127 translation is that this is how *Stimmung* is often translated, and this
1128 introduces confusion as regards their distinction. Indeed, if one were
1129 going to use “attunement”, then it would have to be a translation for
1130 *Stimmung*. Even though Heidegger is not entirely clear and consistent
1131 in a philosophical distinction between *Stimmung* and *Befindlichkeit*
1132 in *BT*, something that contributes to the extinction of the word
1133 *Befindlichkeit* in his post-*BT* analyses, we would still need to translate
1134 the two words (*Befindlichkeit* and *Stimmung*) differently, and “attune-
1135 ment”, if it is to be used at all, is much closer to the word *Stimmung* (or
1136 *Gestimmtheit*) than *Befindlichkeit*.

- 1137 9. For Husserl’s mentalist internalism, see Philipp Berghofer’s recent arti-
1138 cles, as detailed in Note 4.
- 1139 10. Thrownness is a formal indication that Heidegger uses to refer to what
1140 others have called facticity. Whilst this indicates that Heidegger is try-
1141 ing to offer his own phenomenological description without becoming
1142 entangled in the traditional vocabulary, it seems to me that here he
1143 *makes sense* of thrownness *in terms* of facticity, and thus reverts to the
1144 language of German Idealism. I do not think this is a problem though,
1145 because we can think of this the other way round: Heidegger tries to
1146 rethink facticity in a new way, making sense of facticity in terms of
1147 moods and thrownness.
- 1148 11. I take it that the critical reference to *seeing* [*Anschau*en] is primarily
1149 directed at Husserl’s phenomenology. Disposition and mood discloses
1150 being in a way that a phenomenology based on *Anschau*en *cannot* grasp.
- 1151 12. According to my reading, Heidegger does not want moods to be under-
1152 stood as simply the binary opposite of rationality, i.e. as that which
1153 is irrational and remains completely *absent*. In my opinion, whilst
1154 Heidegger wants to clearly retain, to some extent, an irreducible incom-
1155 patibility between moods and rationality, his hermeneutic position does
1156 to a certain extent overlap with linguistic realism, arguing for a qua-
1157 si-organic relationship between moods and concepts; moods are, after
1158 all, definitively involved in concept formation. Moods are recalcitrant
1159 to rational understanding, but they can also be said to be “logos-like”,
1160 and in a way “present” in rational understanding. This is why, in *What*
1161 *is Metaphysics?* Heidegger can argue that *Angst* enables us to speak
1162 about the Nothing. In a sense, Heidegger is consistent with Aristotle’s



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- 1163 position in *Peri Hermeneias*, where in Chapter 1 he says that spoken
1164 sounds are symbols of affections in the soul. [Ἔστι μὲν οὖν τὰ ἐν τῇ
1165 φωνῇ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ παθημάτων σύμβολα, καὶ τὰ γραφόμενα
1166 τῶν ἐν τῇ φωνῇ. καὶ ὡςπερ οὐδὲ γράμματα πᾶσι τὰ αὐτά, οὐδὲ
1167 φωναὶ αἱ αὐταί. ὧν μέντοι ταῦτα σημεῖα πρώτων, ταῦτα πᾶσι
1168 παθήματα τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ ὧν ταῦτα ὁμοιώματα πράγματα ἤδη
1169 ταῦτά.]
- 1170 13. Here, Heidegger clearly moves beyond Husserl's phenomenology,
1171 which is based on "beholding" [*Anschauung*] [I would have rather trans-
1172 lated *Anschauung* as "seeing" or "viewing"]. I believe that in this sentence
1173 Heidegger is tacitly criticizing Husserl, whose phenomenology failed to
1174 take moods as anything other than a "founded" level of intentionality.
- 1175 14. This is very close to Aristotle's notion of movement as *μεταβολή*, and
1176 Aristotle's account of *πάθη* in the *Rhetoric*, as *συμμέρον* or *βλαβερόν*,
1177 and as *ἰδύ* or *λυπηρόν*.

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