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This paper contributes to the genealogical investigation of Heidegger's notion of *Befindlichkeit* as defined in *Sein und Zeit*. The word *Befindlichkeit* first appears in Heidegger's work as a translation of the Aristotelian notion of *διάθεσις*. The philosophical overlaps must be explored: to what extent does the structure and operation that Heidegger ascribes to *Befindlichkeit* in its relation to *Stimmung* overlap with the operation he identifies in Aristotle's notion of *ἔξις* and *πάθος*? According to my reading there is a certain, albeit complex, form of continuity. The essay shows how Heidegger's analysis of *Befindlichkeit* in *Sein und Zeit* retrieves certain characteristics from Aristotle's *ἔξις* whilst clearly rejecting others, i.e. those characteristics which pertain to natural beings present-at-hand rather than *Dasein*.

Dieser Aufsatz leistet einen Beitrag zur genealogischen Forschung des Begriffs der *Befindlichkeit*, wie Heidegger ihn in *Sein und Zeit* bestimmt. Der Begriff der *Befindlichkeit* erscheint erstmals in Heideggers Werk als eine Übersetzung des aristotelischen Begriffs der *διάθεσις*. Die philosophischen Gemeinsamkeiten müssen hinsichtlich der folgenden Frage untersucht werden: Bis zu welchem Grad überschneidet sich die Struktur, die Heidegger der *Befindlichkeit* in ihrer Beziehung zu *Stimmung* zuschreibt, mit der Struktur, die er in den aristotelischen Begriffen der *ἔξις* und des *πάθος* erkennt? In meiner Interpretation gibt es eine bestimmte, jedoch komplexe Form von Kontinuität. Der Aufsatz zeigt wie Heideggers Analyse der *Befindlichkeit* in *Sein und Zeit* bestimmte strukturelle Merkmale von Aristoteles' Begriff der *ἔξις* übernimmt und dabei andere Merkmale, die sich auf Vorhandenes in der Natur beziehen und nicht auf das *Dasein*, klar zurückweist.

Befindlichkeit as retrieval of Aristotelian διάθεσις: Heidegger reading Aristotle in the Marburg years

Introduction

A genealogical investigation into the Heideggerian notion of *Befindlichkeit* as defined in *Sein und Zeit* directs us back to Heidegger's Marburg lectures on Aristotle and Plato.¹ In addition to the philological fact that the word *Befindlichkeit* first appears in Heidegger's work as a translation of the Aristotelian notion of διάθεσις (disposition)², Heidegger himself makes certain suggestive hints as to such a relation in his analysis of *Befindlichkeit* in *Sein und Zeit*, when he names Aristotle as the first philosopher to have investigated the πάθη (passions) in his *Rhetoric*.

Heidegger considered Aristotle's *Rhetoric* to constitute »the first systematic hermeneutic of the everydayness of Being-with-one-another«³ and thus saw it as particularly relevant for grounding *understanding* within the affective life and its accompanying moods which, on an ontological level, it had wrongly been separated from. Heidegger complains that »[w]hat has escaped notice is that the basic ontological Interpretation of the affective life in general has been able to make scarcely one forward step worthy of mention since Aristotle«.⁴ I take these remarks to be clues for the conceptual genealogy of *Befindlichkeit* in Heidegger's own philosophy.

But these remarks are gestures that by themselves do not suffice in proving a genuine philosophical relationship between Heidegger's and Aristotle's understanding of affective life. The philosophical correspondences must be explored: to what extent does the structure and operation that Heidegger ascribes to *Befindlichkeit* in its relation to *Stimmung* correspond to the operation he identifies in Aristotle's notions of comportment (ἔξις) and pathos (πάθος)? According to my reading there is a certain, albeit complex, form of continuity.

A fully comprehensive comparison between Heidegger and Aristotle on this topic would require more space⁵. However, the basis of this encounter can only be set by exploring Heidegger's understanding of the Aristotelian notion of

¹ I would like to thank Tziouanis Georgakis, Andreas Vrahimis, Timothy Secret, Josh Hayes, Tanja Staehler and Christopher Merwin, for giving me feedback concerning the material presented here.

² Theodore Kisiel, *The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time*, Berkeley 1993, 293.

³ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, GA 2, 138.

⁴ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, GA 2, 139.

⁵ A recent resurge of interest in this topic has afforded us with certain excellent articles that explore the relation between Heidegger and Aristotle on this topic in more detail. For example: Josh Hayes, Being-affected: Heidegger, Aristotle, and the pathology of truth, in Daniel O. Dahlstrom (ed.), *Interpreting Heidegger*, Cambridge University Press 2011, 156-173. Lou Agosta, Heidegger's 1924 Clearing of the Affects Using Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, Book II, in: *Philosophy Today* (2010: Winter), 333-345. Josh Hayes, Deconstructing Dasein: Heidegger's Earliest Interpretations of Aristotle's *De Anima*, in: *The Review of Metaphysics* 61/2 (2007), 263-293. Jussi Backman, Divine and mortal motivation: On the movement of life in Aristotle and Heidegger, in: *Continental Philosophy Review* 38 (2006), 241-261.

disposition. The most fruitful point of entry into Heidegger's reading of Aristotle is through the Marburg lectures: the lecture titled *Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie*⁶, delivered during the Summer semester of 1924, and the lecture titled *Platon: Sophistes*⁷, delivered during the Winter semester of 1924-25.

The following exposition proceeds by these steps: Heidegger, in his account of Dasein's practical comportment, argues that Aristotle in fact offers an existential account of disposition of his own. I will then show how Heidegger raises the question of the similarity between Dasein's disposition and geometrical position in Aristotle's phenomenology, and how, in that context, Heidegger dismisses the similarity by maintaining that the former is existential whereas the latter is categorial. I shall firstly show how the fundamental relational structure of comportment is understood as *continuum*, which is derived from Aristotle's *Physics*. I shall then turn to the notion of continuum operative in Heidegger's account of Aristotelian geometry. A difference between the continuum involved in geometrical structures and the continuum involved in praxis can be identified. However, this difference will not be one that corresponds to the difference between present-at-hand entities and Dasein's existence, typical of Heidegger's differentiation between categories and existentials. Rather, both senses of continuum pertain to beings that are present-at-hand. The geometrical continuum will be found to refer to spatial relations and the practical continuum to temporal relations, both articulated in terms of presence-at-hand. This will discredit Heidegger's differentiation between geometrical position and Dasein's disposition, since the structure of continuum they share denotes being as present-at-hand.

According to Heidegger's analysis, the Aristotelian continuum derived from the *Physics* has the character of »betweenness«, a characteristic also exhibited in the continuum that constitutes the structure of Dasein's comportment. Finally, I shall show how Heidegger's analysis of *Befindlichkeit in Sein und Zeit* retrieves certain characteristics from Aristotle's comportment whilst clearly rejecting others, i.e. those which pertain to Aristotle's conception of continuum and containment (*In-Sein*). Ultimately, these are the categories that remain attached to an understanding of the world qua natural present-at-hand beings.

Disposition and comportment in Aristotle

Heidegger analyses Aristotelian comportment in his lecture *Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie* delivered during the Summer semester of 1924. Heidegger's account of disposition thus occurs in the context of analyzing human comportment. The notions of disposition and comportment denote the same phenomenon, in a similar manner to the way in which Heidegger's *Verfassung*

⁶ Heidegger, *Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie*, GA 18.

⁷ Heidegger, *Platon: Sophistes*, GA 19.

and *Befindlichkeit* denote the same phenomenon.⁸ However, they do retain a technical difference also in Aristotle, even if they denote the same kind of quality.⁹ Disposition is how comportment is grasped in the moment of resolved, i.e. virtuous, praxis. As such, disposition is the resolved moment of comportment. Heidegger thus analyses comportment in relation to human praxis which he subsequently calls *existence*.¹⁰

In so far as the grasping is virtuous, it is accompanied by resoluteness (*προαίρεσις*). Resolute comportment is directed towards the moment, the *καίρως*. Heidegger argues that resolute comportment captures the particular being-there in Aristotle's understanding of *Dasein*. In Heidegger's own words, resoluteness is a comportment that shows being-there »more precisely in its *particularity* [...] The Being of human beings, human being as being-there is *particular, at the moment*«. ¹¹ At that very moment comportment is grasped as disposition: in the moment of resolution the human being grasps its Being-there as disposition.¹² In other words, in the authentic moment of resolute grasping, comportment is grasped as disposition. Despite the concrete particularity of the situation, the virtuous grasping of the moment is meant to »seize the moment as a whole«. ¹³ This means that the moment is indeed concrete and particular, yet it also belongs to and maintains a relation with a structural unity as the whole.

Heidegger further explains how for Aristotle disposition occupies a particular position within the structural whole of the situation. Disposition is a »middle« (*μεσότης*); it is an orientation that maintains the mean, in the sense of »middle position«. Heidegger defines this middle position as that which we »apprehend as being-equally-far-away from the ends [...] that which is equally far removed from both ends is addressed as *μέσων* of the matter itself«. ¹⁴ Despite the quasi-quantitative delimitation of disposition, Heidegger insists that Aristotle acquires here an existential understanding of disposition that grasps the character of *Dasein*'s particularity (*καθ' ἑκάστων*). Heidegger juxtaposes disposition with geometrical position, which is also a grasping of the particular point of relational character embedded into a structural whole. However, geometrical position is mathematically measurable and as such oriented towards grasping the being of a *thing*, such as a line. In distinguishing the two, Heidegger explains that for Aristotle disposition is a virtue, and virtue is neither a thing in its constitution nor does it have a thing as its object. Insofar as Aristotle defines virtue as a middle-position, thinks Heidegger, »one can determine the mean of a

⁸ According to my reading, the distinction between *Befindlichkeit* and *Verfassung* is hermeneutically precarious as both notions refer to the same factual phenomenon. Yet, each grasps the phenomenon from a different angle. The safest way to distinguish the two notions is by looking at how Heidegger employs them while keeping in mind the etymologies entailed in each word. *Verfassung* refers to the aspect of the existential structure that accounts for the possibility of *falling*, in so far as *falling* is a certain movement that presupposes a stratum. In this context, Heidegger's question contextualizes the very notion of *Verfassung* eloquently: „Welche Struktur zeigt die »Bewegtheit« des Verfallens?“ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, GA 2, 177. *Verfassung* accounts for the structure that allows *Befindlichkeit* to fall. In Heidegger's own words: „Die Befindlichkeit erschließt nicht nur das *Dasein* in seiner Geworfenheit und Angewiesenheit auf die mit seinem Sein je schon erschlossene Welt, sie ist selbst die existentielle Seinsart, in der es sich ständig an die »Welt« ausliefert, sich von ihr angehen läßt derart, daß es ihm selbst in gewisser Weise ausweicht. Die existenziale Verfassung dieses Ausweichens wird am Phänomen des Verfallens deutlich werden“ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, GA 2, 139.

According to my reading, the duality of *Befindlichkeit* and *Verfassung* emulates the Aristotelian duality of *ἔξις* and *διάθεσις*, as Heidegger interprets them.

⁹ Aristotle, *Organon* 8b.

¹⁰ Heidegger, *Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie*, GA 18, 176.

¹¹ Heidegger, *Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie*, GA 18, 180.

¹² Heidegger, *Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie*, GA 18, 175.

¹³ Heidegger, *Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie*, GA 18, 191.

¹⁴ Heidegger, *Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie*, GA 18, 186.

thing geometrically«. ¹⁵ However, in so far as Aristotle is offering an interpretation of the being of Dasein, the matter is not one of pertaining to a thing (πρᾶγμα), rather it is something that relates to us as it appears to us (πρὸς ἡμᾶς γνωριμότερον), relative to our own being. In this context, Heidegger warns against understanding virtue as normative ethics. Rather, virtue signifies a »basic relation to the being-there of human beings«. ¹⁶

Comportment as continuum in Heidegger's reading of Aristotle

The analysis of disposition in Heidegger's lectures takes place in the context of the discussion of πάθος. What is of interest to Heidegger is how pathos is a fundamental characteristic of beings that have the capacity to move. ¹⁷ In analysing the kinetic phenomenon of πάθος, Heidegger holds that its structure can only be understood in relation to comportment, which characterizes the »manner and mode in which we are in such a πάθος«. ¹⁸ In a certain sense, comportment supplies some sort of ontological »basis« for the experience of change through pathos: »πάθος is a ›changing‹, and accordingly a determinate ›coming to be...‹ out of an earlier situation, but not a changing that would have its course set for itself. Rather, it is a mode of finding-oneself (*Befindlichkeit*) in the world that, at the same time, stands in a possible relation to ἔξις«. ¹⁹

According to Heidegger's interpretation, comportment provides the »place« of human movement in which movement can be appropriated or »had« as a way of being. Heidegger shows how comportment is the actuality (ἐνέργεια) of having (ἔχειν): ἔξις is the ἐνέργεια of having and of what is had. ²⁰ Heidegger thus offers an analysis of how Aristotle understands human comportment through an analysis of *having*. Even though »having« has several meanings for Aristotle, Heidegger identifies a unified underlying meaning. Heidegger articulates the unified meaning to indicate »beings with the being-character of *being after a definite being-possibility*, or its negation, which, in the case of negation, is the same as that of *holding off something from being genuinely as it would like to be*«. ²¹ This shows that the structure of comportment is not static and therefore its relational character is kinetic. In explaining the character of this kinetic relationality, Heidegger introduces the Aristotelian notion of continuum. According to Heidegger, one of the meanings that Aristotle ascribes to »having«, which is the actuality of comportment, is that of »holding off« something from moving (κωλύειν). ²² This »holding off« has the character of continuum, says Heidegger, both in so far as it has the character of togetherness, as well as the character of movement. But here lies the problem: Heidegger explicitly mentions that the notion of continuum is drawn from Aristotle's *Physics* where the issue is how *beings of nature* move. ²³ Besides, one can readily confirm that continuum

¹⁵ Heidegger, *Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie*, GA 18, 186.

¹⁶ Heidegger, *Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie*, GA 18, 179.

¹⁷ Heidegger, *Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie*, GA 18, 168.

¹⁸ Heidegger, *Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie*, GA 18, 168.

¹⁹ Heidegger, *Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie*, GA 18, 171.

²⁰ Heidegger, *Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie*, GA 18, 175.

²¹ Compare this with what Heidegger writes in *Sein und Zeit*: „Die Stimmung erschließt nicht in der Weise des Hinblickens auf die Geworfenheit, sondern als An- und Abkehr“, Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, GA 2, 135.

²² Heidegger, *Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie*, GA 18, 173.

²³ Heidegger, *Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie*, GA 18, 174.

pertains to the movement of physical objects present-at-hand from the examples quoted by Heidegger to illustrate »having« in the sense of »holding off«: the example of Atlas holding the vault of heaven not letting it fall and the example of pillars holding weights.²⁴ It is evident that even though the context of discussion pertains to Dasein's affective life, the paradigm of movement used pertains to natural objects present-at-hand. In addition, Heidegger also points to the fact that the actuality of »having« is also characterized as an »in-between«, a characteristic of continuum that is attached to Heidegger's analysis of continuum as it is developed in Aristotle's *Physics*.

Further to that, it is not only the notion of continuum that bears the character of natural objects present-at-hand. Another characteristic of the »having« of comportment supplied in those pages is that of being a container (περιέχον) that has the character of »being-in«.²⁵ The having of the container, the phenomenon of containing, is defined by Aristotle as the same kind of having that the whole (ὅλον) has of its parts (μέρη). To this extent, comportment is ascribed with the unity of the whole that has parts, in the same sense that a container contains items inside it. Again the Aristotelian examples quoted by Heidegger betray a world that consists of things present-at-hand: the example of a basin containing water and the example of a ship having sailors etc.²⁶ Therefore, even though disposition qua moment, (i.e. in the sense of a part), which maintains a relation to the whole is supposed to be a mode of being radically different from a geometrical quantitative account that refers to human existence, Aristotle's notion of »container« fails to deliver such an existential account. Because of Aristotle's »contaminated« view of continuum and containment, his understanding of comportment is grounded within a conception of the world qua physical world. It makes up a mode of being-in-the-world whose components make comportment a category that betrays a world whose structural unity and wholeness is a »quantifiable sum«.²⁷

Yet it is still important to see in more detail how the Aristotelian continuum is analysed in Heidegger's lectures. In looking at that we will see that Heidegger is right in arguing that Aristotle fastens onto the particularity of sense-perception and admits the particularity given in it as the first factual state of beings, as the continuum is itself grasped from sense-perception. Heidegger shows how the moment, be it disposition or geometrical position, is grounded in the immediacy of sense-perception. In looking at Heidegger's analysis of Aristotle's understanding of geometry, we will see that geometrical position has a relational character, and as such it has the character of continuum. In this context it is important to note that the continuous character of position and disposition is precisely their relational character, which is found to be of the same kind: continuous. In following this path of analysis we will also uncover how continuum is explained in Aristotle's *Physics*, and how the characteristics of continuum identified there are also found in the continuum of comportment.

²⁴ Heidegger, *Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie*, GA 18, 174.

²⁵ Heidegger, *Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie*, GA 18, 173.

²⁶ Heidegger, *Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie*, GA 18, 173.

²⁷ Heidegger, *Platon: Sophistes*, GA 19, 81.

Geometry and continuum: grounded in sense-perception

The structure of the Aristotelian geometrical position is taken up by Heidegger in his lecture course titled *Plato's Sophist* (GA19) delivered during the Winter semester of 1924-25. The discussion of Geometry takes place as Heidegger tries to show how theory involves a countermovement against the immediacy of that which is given in sense-perception (αἴσθησις), that which is given in the particular (καθ'ἕκαστον), even though indeed it does take sense-perception as its point of departure.²⁸ Aristotle grounds the grasp of geometrical position to sense perception. Geometrical structures are grasped in mere sense-perception.²⁹ Geometrical objects, such as the triangle, maintain more kinship to the structure grasped by sense-perception, in comparison to arithmetic, in that they possess a continuous structure: »This peculiar structure of the αἰσθητὸν is preserved in the geometrical, insofar as the geometrical, too, is continuous, συνεχές. The point [the geometrical position, θέσις, C.H.] presents only the ultimate and most extreme limit of the continuous«. ³⁰

Position therefore depends on the prior grasp of the continuum of the whole object. The underlying assumption is that the geometrical position is a moment that denotes *relation*, it is a relating per se. As such, it is a moment within a totality, in the sense that it denotes the limits of this totality in a way that does not constitute the position as a self-subsistent entity, but rather essentially contains within its being a relationship with other positions within the totality. That which lies in-between the positions themselves has the character of continuum. The character of the whole, as well as the mode of relation between its moments, its positions, has the fundamental character of continuum. It is in reference to this mode of relation that the Aristotelian categories of position and disposition acquire their relational character. Heidegger, in that same analysis, again points at the similarity between position, disposition and comportment: »θέσις has the same character as ἕξις, διάθεσις. Ἔξις = to find oneself in a definite situation [*sich befinden in einer bestimmten Lage*], to have something in oneself, to retain, and in retaining to be directed toward something. θέσις= orientation, situation; It has the character of being oriented toward something. ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν πρὸς τι οἶον ἕξις, διάθεσις, ... θέσις (Cat. 7, 6b2f.)«. ³¹ However, despite the categorical closeness between position and disposition, in that both are modalities of continuum, there persists a differentiation among the two that Heidegger identifies: sense-perception involved in grasping geometrical structures in their wholeness differs from sense-perception that grasps the practical situation in its wholeness. As such, in so far as disposition belongs to praxis, its continuum must be grasped differently.

In praxis, writes Heidegger, sense-perception maintains its practical character as its grasp is characterized as circumspection, whereas in geometrical sense-perception it is a matter of pure onlooking, a sheer inspection.³² As such,

²⁸ Heidegger, Platon: Sophistes, GA 19, 98.

²⁹ Heidegger, Platon: Sophistes, GA 19, 117.

³⁰ Heidegger, Platon: Sophistes, GA 19, 112: „Diese eigentümliche Struktur des αἰσθητὸν erhält sich noch im Geometrischen, sofern auch das Geometrische stetig, συνεχές, ist. Der Punkt stellt nur die letzte und äußerste Grenze dieses Stetigen dar“.

³¹ Heidegger, Platon: Sophistes, GA 19, 104.

³² Heidegger, Platon: Sophistes, GA 19, 163.

circumspection grasps the concrete and the temporally momentary in its practicality,³³ whereas inspection grasps that which is eternal in the sense of autonomous and unmoveable (ἀκίνητον). We can imagine Heidegger finding in Aristotle two different ways of grasping the continuum, one pertaining to geometrical sense-perception and the other to practical sense-perception; the first supplying the understanding of the moment qua an entity's position, the latter qua Dasein's disposition. However, we are not given different accounts of continuum by Aristotle in these two respects; the only distinction we have is a continuum that accounts for time and another for space but ultimately the notion of continuum is derived from the *Physics*.

Heidegger shows in greater detail how Aristotle acquires the notion of continuum in the *Physics*. Ultimately, continuum is meant to explain the phenomenon of co-presence, the phenomenon of »being with and being related to one another«. ³⁴ Continuum is determined as a mode of connectedness between things whereby »the limit of the one that touches the other is one and the same limit«. ³⁵ One example of continuum given in that context is when the limits of a house are identical to the limits of another house: continuum means that there is nothing in-between the two related objects. Furthermore, continuum is identified as the »in-between« itself (μεταξύ). ³⁶ Heidegger illustrates this definition of continuum by reciting Aristotle's example of a boat moving up stream, the stream being the »in-between«, the medium through which motion takes place. ³⁷ »Betweenness« is the way Aristotle understands changing being (μεταβάλλον). In Heidegger's own words: »This basic phenomenon is the ontological condition for the possibility of something like extension, μέγεθος: site and orientation are such that from one point there can be a continuous progression to the others; *only in this way is motion understandable*«. ³⁸ Ultimately the character of continuum extends to characterize both time and place (χρόνος and τόπος). ³⁹

We have thus seen how Heidegger moves into a treatment of Aristotle's notion of continuum through his analysis of geometrical position and its relation to sense-perception. We have also seen how Heidegger distinguishes between the grasp of practical sense-perception and geometrical sense-perception. In so far as disposition is a moment of practical life, we would anticipate that Aristotle would have supplied a notion of continuum appropriate to Dasein's affective life. However, continuum, as Heidegger shows, is a category that emerges out of the *Physics* and indicates the mode of connectedness between physical entities that move. The basic distinction between the continuum involved in geometrical position and disposition seems to correspond to the distinction between the kind of continuum involved in spatial relations that are devoid of movement and the kind of continuum involved in temporal relations that have movement. In this context we may even discern in Heidegger's reading a certain hierarchy between spatial continuum and temporal continuum, in the sense that in so far as the very notion of continuum occurs in order to explain kinesis of natural objects, the

³³ Heidegger, Platon: Sophistes, GA 19, 163.

³⁴ Heidegger, Platon: Sophistes, GA 19, 113: „Seins mit oder zu einem anderen“.

³⁵ Heidegger, Platon: Sophistes, GA 19, 115.

³⁶ Heidegger, Platon: Sophistes, GA 19, 113.

³⁷ Heidegger, Platon: Sophistes, GA 19, 114.

³⁸ Heidegger, Platon: Sophistes, GA 19, 119.

³⁹ Heidegger, Platon: Sophistes, GA 19, 119.

continuum involved in geometry is derivative. In summation, the distinction that Heidegger seems to find in Aristotle between the continuum involved in disposition and that of geometrical position is not one that sustains the distinction between the mode of being of Dasein and the mode of being of an entity present-at-hand, according to Heidegger's own standards of the existential analytic supplied in *Sein und Zeit*. Both notions of continuum refer to relations between objects present-at-hand.⁴⁰

Concluding remarks

Heidegger found in Aristotle a radicality with respect to grounding being-in-the-world to the particular that shows up in sense-perception. In this context, Aristotle's understanding of comportment and disposition does emerge out of a commitment to the priority of sense-perception. Heidegger juxtaposes disposition to geometrical position, arguing that the former belongs to that which pertains to Dasein's particular way of Being and as such should not be understood quantitatively, whereas the latter belongs to mere things. However, a more careful look at Heidegger's own analyses of Aristotle reveals that Aristotle fails to offer an account of the structure of comportment that is actually derived from Dasein's particular mode of being. Rather, the structural character of continuum is in fact understood in a similar way to how it operates in geometrical structure, as both are derived from the *Physics*.

Whilst Heidegger does not explicitly point to these shortcomings in his analysis of comportment and disposition, it is discernible from his account of continuum, as it takes place in his brief analysis of geometry, as well as from Heidegger's own account of *Befindlichkeit* and the characteristics he ascribes to it in *Sein und Zeit*.

In his analysis of geometry and continuum, an analysis that came after his analysis of comportment, Heidegger tacitly says that Aristotle did not fully develop an existential analytic. Writes Heidegger: »One must fasten onto precisely the καθ'ἑκάστων of αἴσθησις and admit it as the first factual state of beings. Even Aristotle was successful here only within certain limits, and in spite of his tendency to radicality he did not press on into the ultimate originality of the Being of the world. There is a possible interpretation which even endeavours to see beings of the world detached from the Greek concept of Being. That, however, will not happen in these lectures.«⁴¹ This diagnosis fits perfectly

⁴⁰ Even though Heidegger does not offer a systematic grounding of quantified space and time to a particular mode of manifestation of Nature, in his lectures on Aristotle, he does it in *Sein und Zeit*. For example: „Das klassische Beispiel für die geschichtliche Entwicklung einer Wissenschaft, zugleich aber auch für die ontologische Genesis, ist die Entstehung der mathematischen Physik. Das Entscheidende für ihre Ausbildung liegt weder in der höheren Schätzung der Beobachtung der »Tatsachen«, noch in der »Auswendung« von Mathematik in der Bestimmung der Naturvorgänge – sondern im *mathematischen Entwurf der Natur selbst*. Dieser Entwurf entdeckt vorgängig ein ständig Vorhandenes (Materie) und öffnet den Horizont für den leitenden Hinblick auf seine quantitativ bestimmbaren konstitutiven Momente (Bewegung, Kraft, Ort und Zeit)“ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, GA 2, 362. He also makes explicit the connection between nature as present-at-hand and continuum: „Man sieht die Stetigkeit der Zeit im Horizont eines unauflösbaren Vorhandenen“ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, GA 2, 423. Further on, he explicitly refers to Aristotle: „Die erste überlieferte, thematisch ausführliche Auslegung des vulgären Zeitverständnisses findet sich in der »Physik« des *Aristoteles*, das heißt im Zusammenhang einer Ontologie der *Natur*. »Zeit« steht mit »Ort« und »Bewegung« zusammen“ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, GA 2, 428.

⁴¹ Heidegger, *Platon: Sophistes*, GA 19, 85-86: „Das ist auch dem *Aristoteles* nur in gewissen Grenzen gelungen, so daß er trotz der radikalen Tendenz nicht zur letzten Ursprünglichkeit des Seins der Welt gedrungen ist. Es ist eine Interpretation

Aristotle's analysis of comportment. Whilst Heidegger does not explicitly say this, it seems to be for this reason that in his analysis of *Befindlichkeit* in *Sein und Zeit* he retrieves the basic operational character that he identifies in Aristotelian comportment. However, simultaneously, he explicitly criticizes certain characteristics of Aristotelian comportment, in particular the ones pertaining to beings that are present-at-hand, characteristics that refer to the structure of continuum as Aristotle derived it in his *Physics*: Thus in his own account of *Befindlichkeit*, Heidegger will retrieve the character of being-there as »Being-In« (the World), as well as the character of »turning towards or turn away« (*An- und Abkehr*) from mood.⁴² These are also characteristics in Aristotle's notion of comportment. However, when Heidegger addresses the »insiderness« of *Befindlichkeit* he makes the following remarks: »In which direction must we look, if we are to characterize Being-in, as such, phenomenally? [...] Being-in is distinct from the present-at-hand insiderness of something present-at-hand 'in' something else that is present-at-hand; Being-in is rather an essential kind of Being of this entity itself. But in that case, what else is presented with this phenomenon than the *commercium* which is present-at-hand *between* a subject-present-at-hand and an Object present-at-hand? Such an interpretation would come closer to the phenomenal content if we were to say that *Dasein is the Being* of this 'between'. Yet to take our orientation from this 'between' would still be misleading«. ⁴³ Here lies Heidegger's criticism of Aristotle's conception of comportment and disposition, since the notion of »in-between« implies the character of continuum, and the »insiderness« that Heidegger criticizes here is the insiderness involved in Aristotle's notion of container.

möglich, die selbst versucht, das Seiende der Welt, abgelöst vom griechischen Seinsbegriff, zu sehen. Das soll aber nicht hier im Kolleg geschehen".

⁴² Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, GA 2, 135.

⁴³ Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, GA 2, 132: „Was anderes stellt sich aber Dann mit diesem Phänomen dar als das vorhandene *commercium zwischen* einem vorhandenen Subjekt und einem vorhandenen Objekt? Diese Auslegung käme dem phänomenalen Bestand schon näher, wenn sie sagte: *das Dasein ist das Sein* dieses 'Zwischen'. Irreführend bliebe die Orientierung an dem 'Zwischen' trotzdem".

